Exchange rate instability and economic reform : with specific reference to Russian exchange rate reforms in the early 1990's by Ca'Zorzi, Michele
 warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/109296  
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
T H E  B R IT IS H  L IB R A R Y
BRITISH THESIS SERVICE
COPYRIGHT
Reproduction of this thesis, other than as permitted under 
the United Kingdom Copyright Designs and Patents Act 
1988, or under specific agreement with the copyright 
holder, is prohibited.
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it 
is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis 
may be published without proper acknowledgement.
REPRODUCTION QUALITY NOTICE
Th e  quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the 
quality of the original thesis. Whilst every effort has been 
made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction, some 
pages which contain small or poor printing may not 
reproduce well.
Previously copyrighted material (journal articles, published 
texts etc.) is not reproduced.
THIS THESIS HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED
E xchange R ate  In s ta b ility  an d  Econom ic Reform
w ith specific reference to R ussian  exchange ra te  reform s in the early  1990’s
M ichele C a’Zorzi
T hesis Subm itted  for the  D egree of PhD in Economics
Department of Economics 
University o f Warwick 
March 1998
I

A b stra c t
This thesis is concerned with the origins of exchange rate instability and the scope 
for economic reform. Several aspects of recent macroeconomic instability in Russia 
are discussed which, we argue, reveal the origins of this problem.
The first chapter combines currency substitution and price stickiness. It aims to 
account for the weakness of the real exchange rate and the net accumulation of 
foreign exchange, that so frequently characterise unstable economies. The essence of 
the discussion is that, when faced with severe tight controls on capital, agents are 
able to substitute foreign currency for local currency via the current account. The 
model has a simple dynamic structure, similar to the Dombusch model.
The second chapter uses the Cohen and Michel procedure to extend the time 
inconsistency approach to an open economy, a-la-Dombusch framework. A special 
loss function is used, but the same methodology may be applied to address other 
economic issues. When time consistency is assumed, future loose monetary policies 
are foreseen and hence have current consequences We argue that the more the 
government has an inflationary instinct, the greater the experience of undervaluation 
and the fall in liquidity.
The third chapter builds on the work of the second. It is argued that even in this open 
economy. a-la-Dornbusch framework, the standard result holds: credibility is 
enhanced by delegating monetary policy to a conservative central banker. The 
economic consequences of this are twofold: a smaller real exchange rate 
undervaluation and a reduced fall in liquidity. In addition, we propose an extension 
of this analysis by letting currency substitution, between domestic and foreign assets, 
be the alternative assumption to perfect capital mobility. The assumption of currency 
substitution leav es largely unchanged the dynamic structure of the analysis, but gives 
rise to a quite different economic interpretation.
The fourth chapter describes the reasons why policy makers decide on restrictive 
foreign exchange policies. A currency substitution framework is used to highlight the 
consequences of foreign exchange leakages between official and black markets. The 
model is solved by applying the technique suggested by Dixit and Currie to 
determine the free variable as a function of the predetermined variables of the 
system
A fifth chapter attempts to pull together the main arguments, and conclusions arising 
from these, which have been discussed throughout the thesis.
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In tro d u c tio n
Horder (1997: 17) argues that "under the socialist system the main instrument for 
savings was domestic money". However, long spells of high inflation during the 
early 90’s have turned Russia into, what may be described as, a "cashless society", 
(The Economist, 1997: 6) relying mainly on barter and foreign exchange This has 
resulted in great economic instability giving rise to frequent criticism on how the 
Russian authorities handled the economy during that period. It is. therefore, the 
primary objective of this thesis to evaluate the early 90's Russian monetary policies 
and foreign exchange market reforms, exploring whether this economic instability, 
although unavoidable, could have been mitigated, and whether lessons can be drawn 
for countries in similar circumstances. In order to discuss this, the thesis will be 
organised in five chapters as follows:
In chapter 1, P.xchange Rale Undervaluation in the Absence of Perfect Capital 
Mobility: the Russian ( use, we first review the reasons why radical reformers, such 
as Yegor Gaidar and Boris Fedorov, were not in a position to halt the large monetary 
flow, which the Russian economy was witnessing. At the same time, there is a 
description of how, in a relative short time, Russia moved to a system of current 
account convertibility, liberalised prices and favourable retention rules, the purpose 
being to bring most of the economy back to legal channels.
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This was certainly not an easy set of policies to cany out, considering the sudden 
breakdown of monetary control in the rouble zone and the extent to which official 
prices had been repressed. As pointed out by Bruno (1993: 16), current account 
convertibility is a risky option in an economy without inflation hedges, since 
"demand for foreign exchange reflects primarily a stock demand”. We maintain that 
a currency substitution model is appropriate to describe the Russian economic 
environment.
The simple model developed here shows how, even in the absence of perfect capital 
mobility, a monetary expansion brings about the overshooting of the exchange rate. 
The economic insight of the model is the following: the weakness of the exchange 
rate improves the external position of the country, supplying the foreign exchange 
needed to satisfy economic agents' portfolio demands. The possession of foreign 
exchange as a store of value is sometimes called internal capital flight' This is a 
common alternative to a real capital flight whenever capital account restrictions are 
in place. Both internal capital flight, and temporary real exchange rate weakness, are 
standard features of unstable economies, which rely on printing money for financing 
purposes. The model combines price stickiness and currency substitution, and can be 
reduced to a linear system of two differential equations.
In chapter 2, Time Consistency in an Open Economy, a-la-Dornhusch, two different 
models are presented:
I ) the first, is the Barro (1983) seigniorage model, which offers an insight to high 
inflation, perfectly consistent with the hypothesis of the rationality of economic 
agents. It is an application of the time consistency framework. Despite the
commitment of a future tight monetary policy, economic agents understand the 
government's great difficulties for financing the budget and hence correctly 
foresee the real future monetary policies. Their response is to hold less money, so 
lowering the inflation tax. It is a one period model;
2) the second, is the Buiter Miller (1981) model, which emphasises the 
significance of the different speed of adjustment between the financial and the 
goods market. The time horizon is infinity. A key figure of the whole analysis is 
here presented: it is the phase diagram of the system of differential equations, 
expressed as a function of the real exchange rate, c and of real balances. / The 
stable manifold of the system allows one to examine the overshooting of the 
exchange rate in the aftermath of a monetary shock.
The aim of this chapter is to integrate these two models in a common theoretical 
framework. The first problem to consider is how to make the time horizon of the two 
models compatible This is solved by postulating a policy maker who minimises a 
quadratic discounted stream of costs over an infinite time period, subject to the 
Buiter Miller model. Thus, it is an optimal control problem
After having calculated the standard optimal control solution, it is important to refer 
to the time consistency literature. In fact, the derived solution violates Belman's 
principle of optimality. So far this is the time inconsistent solution.
Thus, it becomes necessary to find an alternative wav to calculate the time consistent 
solution Our analysis refers to the Cohen and Michel (1988) article, where it is 
shown how standard control theory should be modified to obtain time consistent
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solutions in a dynamic framework with forward looking variables. The derivation of 
the time consistent solution, suggested by the Cohen and Michel technique, requires 
the assumption of a predetermined linear relationship between c and / . The 
application of this method allows one to reduce the number of state variables to only 
one, /.
The time consistent solution to the above problem, can be represented by a phase 
diagram entirely analogous to the one characterised by the Buiter Miller model The 
crucial difference is that the growth rate of money is here endogenous. The exchange 
rate overshooting critically depends on the policy makers' aversion to inflation. The 
model therefore predicts that the greater the government's need to finance the deficit 
and to subsidise the debts of enterprises by printing money, the greater the real 
exchange rate jump As a consequence, the analysis can justify the scale o f the 
Russian undervaluation
In chapter 3, Exchange Rale I 'ndervaluaimn and In.slitmional Reform, our objective 
is to apply the previous analysis to the Russian undervaluation experience. Firstly, 
we maintain that it is important to verify whether the empirical data at our disposal 
gives some support to the theoretical analysis. There seems to be some evidence that 
the real exchange rate appreciation and fall in real balances had a common trend, 
thus giving empirical support to chapter 2.
This begs the question whether institutional reform would have been the appropriate 
response to the government’s policy credibility problem. For example, recent 
literature has explored the possibility of a currency board system. There is also the
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well-known issue of monetary policy delegation. The standard result, that the 
optimal central banker should be conservative, holds here.
The really interesting point here is the possibility of extending the key Buiter Miller 
figure, to the context of monetary delegation. Our analysis reaches the conclusion 
that, if Russia had replaced Gerashchenko, by appointing a suitably conservative 
central banker, the adjustment path would have remained similar but less harmful. 
Enhanced credibility signifies both a smaller real exchange rate undervaluation, and 
a larger tax base for seigniorage.
Finally, we extend the currency substitution model developed in chapter I. Exchange 
Rate Undervaluation in the Absence o f Perfect Capital Mobility: the Russian Case, 
to the constraint of time consistency. It can be shown that, with monetary policy 
delegation, not only the exchange rate weakness is reduced, but so is also the overall 
stock of foreign exchange held by the private sector.
In chapter 4. Internal Capital blight in a Black Market Exchange Rate Econoniv we 
explore the reasons why black market exchange rates develop and the likely 
consequences on the remaining macroeconomic system
Russian radical reformers encouraged exporters to act through legal channels by 
easing the foreign exchange surrender rules. Over time, significant steps were made 
to ensure current account convertibility, and. in addition, there were no serious 
attempts to defend the rouble or to restrict current account convertibility after July 
1992. This was certainly courageous
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[n similar circumstances policy makers frequently prefer to keep the domestic 
currency artificially overvalued. This is the single most important factor originating a 
black market exchange rate, as the existing literature confirms.
We develop a stylised black market exchange rate economy. Frustrated demand 
spills over into the black market exchange rate. Exporters are compelled by law to 
supply dollars into the official market; however if there is a black market premium, 
they are ready to under invoice their revenues and divert dollars into the black 
market. Thus, even when retention rules are tight, internal capital flights are still 
possible, if the black market current account is positive. Net accumulation of foreign 
exchange is achieved with illegal means. For this reason it may be referred to as 
illegal internal capital flight.
Technically, we combine a currency substitution equation, an equation for the black 
market current account and finally, an equation for reserves The model can be 
reduced to a non-linear system of differential equations. Subsequently, we solve the 
model by applying the technique suggested by Dixit (1980) and Currie (1985) to 
determine the free variable as a function of the predetermined variables of the 
system. This allows us to examine what the impact effect is of exogenous changes of 
both money supply and of the official exchange rate. As regards a monetary 
expansion, the analysis arrives at the standard result that a monetary expansion leads 
to a rise in the black market premium. Such a rise spurs exporters' willingness to 
divert more hard currency into the black market, hence satisfying the greater foreign 
currency stock demand
6
As regards an official exchange rate devaluation, we explore Morris’ argument 
(1995) that this is likely to be a successful policy, if the country' is a net receiver of 
foreign aid. On the other hand, if the country relies on an overvalued exchange rate 
as a implicit source ot revenue, a devaluation has a negative fiscal impact, possibly 
undermining the stabilisation attempt.
Finally, in chapter 5 we attempt to summarise the main arguments which have been 
discussed throughout the thesis and to suggest further developments of this research.
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Chapter 1
E xchange R ate  U n d e rv a lu a tio n  in  th e  A bsence of 
P erfec t C ap ita l M obility: th e  R u ss ia n  Case
1.1 Russian Economic Background
1.11 An Overview on the Real Exchange Rate W eakness in R ussia
In the early 90‘s currencies have typically been weak in the former USSR and 
Eastern Europe. While economists often recognise the dangers of having overvalued 
currencies, in terms of losses of export markets, which may never be recovered 
(Dornbusch, 1988: 80-107), they tend to be less concerned with the risks of 
undervalued exchange rates. Indeed, when the exchange rate is fixed to a nominal 
anchor, it is conventional wisdom to be cautious and initially choose a weak parity 
for the exchange rate. However, the extent and scale of the undervaluation 
phenomenon in Eastern Europe and Russia in the early 90’s have been so impressive 
that their economic causes and consequences cannot be ignored. Bruno, for instance, 
suggested that in Poland in 1989, and in Czechoslovakia in 1990, the free exchange
8
rate valued foreign exchange at roughly ten times more that the PPP parity, while in 
Russia in 1991-1992 the exchange rate reached the high peaks of 15 or 20 (Bruno, 
1993: 16) times such a benchmark value. The large size of the Russian 
undervaluation in the early 90's is also broadly confirmed by the statistics gathered 
in a recently established journal, Russian Economic Trends (see Table 1.1), which 
monitors the progress of the Russian economy.
T a b le  1.1 R ussian  Real E xchange Rate
Actual/PPP
1991
December 33.3
1992
Januarv h i
Februarv 9.1
March r n
April 5.9
Mav 4.3
•lune 3.6
July 3.8
August 4.2
September 4.8
October 6.7
November 6.7
December 5.3
1993
Januarv 4.6
February 4.8
March 4.6
April 4.6
Mav 4.6
.1 une 4.6
July 3.4
August 3.1
(source: Russian Econom ic Trends1. 1993: 25)
1 It would be possible to add more data to this table While the general trend remains a continuous 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, we prefer to exclude these data since the source for the PPP 
estimates is not the same as the one used in this table
According to this series, in December 199! the rouble valued even less than what 
suggested by Bruno, namely the outstanding figure of 33.3 times the estimated PPP 
number. According to the same series by January 1992 the rouble had partly 
recovered its value as the ratio between the actual and the PPP exchange rate fell to 
11.1 The basic reason for this is that the Russian authorities in January 1992 started 
a process of radical reforms which included the liberalisation of several 
administrative prices. By looking at the monthly plot of inflation a large spike can be 
seen in January 1992 (see Fig. 1.1), which largely exceeded what most analysts had 
expected' (see Gomulka (1995: 332-333) and Horder (1997: 23-24) for a discussion 
on this issue).
The direct consequence to the large price jump is that the scale of the exchange rate 
undervaluation was immediately lowered. Nevertheless. Il l remains a very large 
figure for it means that the local currency valued less than 10 % of its purchasing 
power parity value! From January 1992 onwards the real exchange rate followed a 
more gradual trend of appreciation.
For reasons discussed later on in this chapter, the 1992 official data, while 
commonly employed to discuss the Russian performance, overestimates the size of 
the rouble undervaluation (see Goldberg, 1993: 852-864). There is no doubt, 
however, that the rouble was vastly undervalued, as is also confirmed by available 
black market data (Russian Economic Trends, 1992: 84).
: In this thesis we have employed data from various issues of “Russian Economic Trends" With regard 
to computer software, we have relied on “Microfit” for estimation purposes while we have used “Excel 
5“ to represent time series. Furthermore, in the following chapters we carry out simulations analysis 
using “Mathematica" Finally, all the remaining diagrams are represented using “Freelance Graphics"
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The weakness of the Russian exchange rate did not remain unnoticed by world 
economic investors as it provided the opportunity to acquire Russian assets at low 
prices. This is shown, for example, by the following extract taken from the 
Economist (1994: 94):
To most people the Weimar Republic signifies economic collapse, social 
turmoil and, eventually, the rise of Hitler Marc Faber, a Hong Kong-based 
investor, takes a different view, “the Weimar hyperinflation”, he says, “provided 
the best buying opportunity for German shares this century”. Mr Faber uses 
Daimler to prove his point. By November 1922, the company's market 
capitalisation was 980m paper marks. A single Daimlercar then cost 3m paper 
marks, so it would have been possible to buy the whole company for the price of 
only 327 of its cars. The opportunity was short-lived, however In 1923 a 
speculative fury gripped the German stockmarket, which rose 15 times, 
measured in dollar terms. Mr Faber believes that Russian assets are now almost 
as undervalued as German ones were in 1922. He is not alone. In the first 
quarter of this year foreign portfolio investors put an estimated S400m into 
shares of Russian companies. Longer-term strategic investors have pumped in 
far more: over the past four years they have committed S 1 1.6 billion
In addition to all the legal opportunities to buy Russian goods and assets cheaply, a 
massive exchange rate undervaluation prompted all kinds of illegal activities to 
flourish (see Goldman 1996: 1 17). Surrender rules, export licenses and quotas were 
supposed to hinder the underselling of national resources to foreigners, but rogue 
traders often managed to find ways to elude the existing tax system. As Aslund 
(1995: 150) says.
"rogue traders were depriving Russia of its national wealth by selling raw 
material cheaply abroad. Undervoicing was chronic, often because the 
exporters did not own the products they exported to their own benefit. The call 
fo strict export controls was overwhelming.”
To halt the damage caused by these frauds and by the general complexity of the 
system, Russian policy makers realised that it was necessary to progressively
simplify foreign exchange rate rules and over time to complete all the necessary 
steps to attain current account convertibility. Above all. it was vital to carrv out 
economic reforms which would encourage exporters to channel hard currencies 
through official markets
1.12 The P rospects of C u rren t Account C onvertib ility  betw een th e  Final 
Y ears of the  Soviet Union an d  the  S ta r t  of Radical Reforms
It is well-known that during the years of Communism, currencies had not been 
convertible and all trade matters had been settled by the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance. The countries involved in such a system were: 
Czechoslovakia. Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria. Romania and the USSR. Trade was 
recorded bewteen the CMEA countries at the International Bank for Economic 
Cooperation in Moscow. Payments were carried out in national currencies and the 
common unit of accountancy was the Transferable Rouble. In practice exchange 
rates were established by political agreement, while to a large extent trade was 
bilateral as deficits between any two countries could not persist for long.
In short, the system was plainly biased against trade The rationale for this pattern of 
trade was the communist notion that trade is not growth enhancing - through 
competition and variety - but essentially is only a necessity required by the different 
allocation of resources across countries. With the defeat of Communism, the concept 
that trade itself is an engine of growth revived, and convertibility, therefore, 
suddenly became an objective for all the CMEA countries.
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As it is well known that the IMF regulation (Article 8 Section 2) explicitly requires 
current account convertibility with the following objectives:
1) to bring the correct price signals to the market
2) to increase the size of the market, reducing any existing monopoly power
3) to allow a wider consumption choice to consumers
4) to allow a greater choice of inputs to producers
As tar back as November 1989, the Soviet Union had started moving in this direction 
by introducing currency auctions. As Goldberg (1992: 6) says “this marked the start 
of a period of exchange-rates movements that in principle would be driven by market 
forces". In theory. Soviet exporting enterprises could sell hard currency on a 
voluntary base In practice, however, in 1989 surrender requirements rules were still 
extremely severe, as the fraction of foreign currency earnings which could be freely 
allocated in these markets was less than 10 percent. Thus, the early foreign-currency 
auctions which took place in the Soviet Union "have been characterized by a 
distinctive shortage of exporters willing to voluntary sell foreign exchange" 
(Goldberg 1992: 7) As a consequence, not only was it necessary to ration foreign 
exchange demand, but, in several circumstances, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) 
had to intervene to defend the rouble by depleting its hard currency reserves.
Moreover, the Soviet Union was characterised by a system o f multiple exchange 
rates which survived up until 1992. It was particularly complex: for each currency 
transaction a different exchange rate was applied which depended on both the region 
and the goods traded. Hence, it is not surprising that the Soviet economy - 
characterized by several exchange rates and a multitude of exemption rules - was
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liable to all kinds of frauds. In general, exporters were compelled to sell their foreign 
exchange at unfavourable prices, whilst some importers were given the opportunitv 
to buy hard currency at exceptionally advantageous prices. All unsatisfied demand 
for hard currency inexorably spilled over into the black market. As exporters 
recognised the existence of this residual demand, they were more than willing to 
divert part of their hard gained currency into the parallel market.
Before long the Russian political scene was going to experience major changes 
which would step up the process of economic reform. On June 12 1991 Boris Yeltsin 
was in fact elected President of Russia and later in the same year, between the 19th 
and 21st of August, an abortive Communist coup took place, undermining 
Gorbachev's leadership For some time the Soviet Union seemed to be on the brink 
of both social and economic collapse (Aslund, 1995: 52):
"The severity of the acute financial crisis of 1991 can hardly be exaggerated. 
The Soviet budget deficit had risen to at least 20 percent of GDP. and it had 
skyrocketed out of control. International financing had been exhausted, and the 
USSR defaulted on its foreign payments in December 1991. The USSR 
suffered from a combination of high and rising inflation, and it endured 
massive shortages and long queues because of a huge monetary overhang."
Until then Russia had managed to prevent the outburst of a fully-fledged 
hyperinflationary process by strictly controlling administrative prices. However, it 
turned out to be impossible to halt large wage increases, as well as to control credit 
and social expenditure Hence the Russian economy was suffering from a large 
monetary overhang which soon led the way to a dangerous supply collapse: prices, in 
fact, were low to the point that it had become hardly worthwhile for producers to 
keep up production or to sell goods in official stores. Furthermore. Russians started
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storing goods and, more and more frequently, buying and selling foreign currencies 
in black markets.
While credit to enterprises seemed to be boundless, money was becoming 
increasingly meaningless as it hardly served the purpose of buying consumption 
goods. Large enterprises, especially, were subject to soft budget constraints as "'the 
state netted out debts between enterprises at the end of the year and offered cheap 
loans to cover those enterprises that had deficits" (Aslund 1995: 178). So they had no 
need to economize on real balances and no need to borrow at demanding 
"commercial rates'. All balance sheets difficulties could be simply resolved by what 
Skidelsky and Halligan (1996: 28) have aptly defined as "phone call financing"
Clearly these policies could not be sustained for long. Two political developments in 
fact shook Russia in December 1991 On the 8th of December the USSR was 
abolished in accordance to the agreement signed in Belovezhsky by the leaders of 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine In the same month Yegor Gaidar was appointed as 
Minister of the Economy and Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and launched a set of 
radical reforms Gaidar persuaded Yeltsin that it was absolutely necessary to 
eliminate as soon as possible the large monetary overhang by liberalising 
administrative prices. This policy needed to be matched by a substantial 
improvement in the government budget, reducing at least one of the main causes of 
inflationary pressure. Arms procurement, state investments and subsidies were 
immediately curbed. Several payments were also delayed: a policy which in the short 
run reduced the need to finance the deficit by printing money Social expenditures 
were, on the other hand, not immediately targeted with the clear objective to reduce 
the political cost of reform. On the revenue side, the government decided not to
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establish personal taxes, as it was extremely hard for the bureaucratic establishment 
to collect them. Taxes needed to be primarily levied on large enterprises, because it 
was easier to monitor their payments. In January 1992 VAT was then introduced at a 
unified rate of 28 percent with the aim to add revenues to those from the already 
existing profit and payroll taxes.
Radical reformers wished to attain currency convertibility by replacing all the 
complex surrender requirements regulations, licenses, and multiple exchange rates 
with a much simpler system of tariffs (Aslund 1995: 11). However, they decided to 
liberalise foreign exchange markets with a gradual strategy as they were anxious of 
not being capable of collecting export and import taxes. Moreover, it proved very 
difficult to win over all the existing vested interests, which were particularly strong 
in the import sector.
1.13 A ccom plishm ent of C u rre n t Account C onvertibility in R ussia
At the beginning of 1992 the Russian government decided to push forward foreign 
exchange market reforms with the intention to achieve current account 
convertibility As regards the export sector, from January 1992 the system of 
multiple currency coefficients was abolished, but the following surrender rules were 
established: 40 percent of currency earnings would now be sold to the Hard Currency 
Hoard of the CBR at the extremely unfavourable rate of 55 roubles per dollar. An 
additional 10 percent would be surrendered to the Central Bank's Stabilisation fund 
"at what was supposedly the commercial rate which was fixed at 100 roubles per 
dollar" (Aslund 1995: 148) All the remaining hard currency could be either 
deposited in Russian bank accounts or built up to buy imports or, as final alternative,
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sold in the free market exchange rate, in Moscow through currency auctions which 
regularly took place twice a week. The clear objective was to develop an official 
currency market while maintaining the revenue for the state from the exporting 
sector.
As regards the import side "so-called centralized imports persisted for vital goods, 
with a multitude of highly subsidized currency coefficients.” (Aslund 1995: 148). 
Residents were entitled to acquire foreign exchange on these official markets as long 
as they possessed a regular import certificate (Russian Economic Trends, 1992 1.1: 
32).
Although regulations had become more favourable, exporters were still reluctant to 
proceed through legal channels As a matter of fact, during the first currency auctions 
the foreign exchange market remained, as a rule, very thin' - the whole weekly 
turnover on the main market in Moscow did not exceed S 15 million At first sight 
this seems odd. considering that during the first half of 1992 in these auction markets 
the dollar was sold at exceptionally high prices, well above the corresponding black 
market values (see Fig. 1.2). Note, for example, that the auction exchange rate 
peaked on the 28th of January 1992 at 230 roubles to the dollar while on the same 
day the black market exchange rate was valued at the much smaller rate of 128 
roubles to the dollar1
However, if an effective exchange rate series is defined which accounts for the 
existing surrender rules', the spread between official and black market prices
The effective exchange rate, V was calculated as follows 
1 =  0.4 • 55 +  0.10 • 100 +  0.5 • A where /( is the auction rate
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becomes much smaller (see Fig. 1.2), thus explaining why exporters were still 
reluctant to channel Foreign exchange transactions through legal markets.
Another good explanation For the rouble weakness in these auction markets is that 
exporters were not compelled to sell a halF oF their earnings. In view oF the highly 
inflationary climate, they generally preferred to deposit Foreign exchange into 
Russian bank accounts. For this reason, it was the Central Bank oF Russia which had 
in several circumstances to provide the necessary resources to ensure that auction 
markets would take place.
The above discussion also clarifies why throughout the first halFoF 1992 the auction 
Foreign exchange figures, as published in Russian Economic Trends, overestimate 
the undervaluation of the rouble. To put it briefly, exporters were not offered a good 
deal such as official numbers seem to suggest. This discussion also help explain why 
changes in legislation regarding surrender and retention rules affect the reliability 
and quality of official data.
Looking at the spread between the black and effective exchange rate (see Fig. 1.2), 
the black market premium was negative in the first few months of 1992 This 
suggests that at the outset of reform the Russian authorities were prepared to pay an 
implicit subsidy to exporters, with the objective of bringing foreign exchange 
transactions back to legal markets.
But soon after there was a return to a more standard situation of a positive black 
market premium Goldberg (1993) has for example estimated that, if all the existing 
surrender rules and the prevailing currency auctions exchange rates are accounted
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for, in April 1992 the effective exchange rate was roughly equal to 106 roubles to the 
dollar, which compares to 125 roubles to the dollar offered on the black market (see 
Table 1.2).
T ab le  1.2 Com parison of Effective Exchange R ates on T ransactions 
Before and After th e  Ju ly  1992 Reform s (roubles per dollar)
Pre-unification
Black
market
Legal
Market
Post-unification
Black
market
Legal
Market
Exporters
125 106 145 135
Importers
(excludes centralized 
imports priced at special 
budgetary exchange rates) 130 150 140 135
(source Goldberg. 1993: 862)
Her estimates are in line with ours (see Fig 1.2) and confirm that in April 1992 
exporters would have been better off by diverting hard currencies away from official 
markets'
On the import side from February 1992 exchange rates which applied to centralized 
imports were reduced to "only" 25 and prices which applied were extremely 
favourable, ranging from 1.7 roubles per dollar to 70 roubles per dollar As a 
consequence all other importers were rationed: in April this was achieved, for 4
4 Goldberg chooses the April data because between May and June there was "heavy CBR intervention 
in foreign exchange markets" (footnote 13 HO2)
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example, by setting the exchange rate at 150 roubles per dollar, which was an even 
more expensive price than the 130 roubles required in black markets (see Table 1.2). 
Goldberg's conclusion is that before July 1992 there was still an incentive to 
exchange currencies on the black market exchange rate for both exporters and 
importers.
From July 1992 onwards surrender rules were substantially relaxed. Thereafter 50 
percent of all earnings could be retained, while the remaining part had to be sold to 
the CBR (30 percent) and to the Russian currency market (20 percent) (Aslund.
1995: 148)5.
These final changes turned out to be sufficient to unify the exchange rate for all 
goods traded - with the exception of centralized imports - and to establish current 
account convertibility: Goldberg estimated that this was achieved at the approximate 
rate of 135 roubles to the dollar (see Table 1.2). Over time the Moscow Interbank 
Foreign Currency Exchange (MICEX) became gradually more important in terms of 
weekly turnover, until finally currency auctions became a daily feature.
The basic objective of the above discussion has been to describe how. in a relative 
short time. Russia moved to a system of current account convertibility, liberalised 
prices and favourable retention rules, the purpose being to bring most of the 
economy back to legal channels. As a final remark to this section, it is important to 
note that the Russian authorities decided to preserve tight administrative controls 
with regard to capital account transactions. Experience with capital flights advised 
against even more radical foreign exchange reforms.
From July 1993 50 % of earnings could be retained, while the remaining part had to be sold to 
commercial hanks
1.2 The Origins of Exchange Rate Instability in Russia
1.21 P re lim inary  Rem arks
As we saw in section 1.1, there is overwhelming evidence that in the early 90’s the 
rouble has been undervalued. Such an undervaluation has persisted, possibly even 
strengthened, when the Russian authorities decided to relax the existing retention 
rules and move to a system of current account convertibility
It is not easy to identify the key aspects of currency weakness and to relate the 
Russian and other episodes of exchange rate undervaluation to a standard theoretical 
background. The first possible reference at our disposal is the overshooting 
literature, which says that, given perfect capital mobility, loose monetary policies are 
matched bv undervalued exchange rates. The classic insight of this literature is that 
expansionary monetary policies reduce the attractiveness of the local currency , to the 
point that agents are no longer willing to hold it unless it becomes sufficiently cheap 
to compensate for the low nominal interest rate. Before attempting to develop a more 
formal analysis accounting for the Russian financial crisis, we think appropriate to 
first review the sources of monetary creation in Russia
1.22 Sources of M onetary C reation  in R ussia
By all accounts it is certainly the case that Russia could not immediately halt the 
enormous growth in the rate of money supply. As Skidelsky and Halligan (1996 15)
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have correctly pointed out there was "one source of money creation but four taps'". 
The "four taps' were the following:
a) the government budget deficit;
b) enterprise subsidies;
c) credits to commercial banks;
d) FSU Republics Technical Credits'
a) The Government Budget Deficit
Our discussion starts with the first obvious source of rouble creation: the Russian 
government budget deficit. From the very beginning of his mandate Gaidar realised 
that it was urgent to reduce the large government budget deficit which had reached, 
in 1991, the amazing figure of 30 percent of GDP It was crucial to bring this figure 
down to a sustainable level in order to establish credibility in the government's 
policies. Gaidar's attempt was initially successful: during the first quarter of 1992 he 
surprisingly managed to attain a budget surplus approximately equal to 0.9 percent of 
GDP It must be said that this result needs to be partly qualified inasmuch as it 
depended on the deferral of expenditures and commitments which sooner or later 
would have to be met Nonetheless, these policies, probably for the first time, 
signaled to financial markets the will, if not the strength, to cope with tough 
unpopular decisions (Aslund, 1995: 189).
Despite all the good will. Gaidar - even if he had wanted to - could not prevent the 
widening of the so-called 'internal deficit' The latter was more significant than the 
government budget deficit, as it also took into account the large expenditures, which
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the Russian state was subject to, derived from the frequent leveling out of enterprise 
debts These policies were not, in fact, under the direct control of the government as 
it was the CBR which granted enterprise credit.
h) Enterprise Subsidies
A second source of rouble creation derived from the frequent recurrence of policy 
makers to enterprise subsidies. According to many commentators, this tendency 
started to get worse when Viktor Gerashchenko was appointed as chair of the CBR 
on July 17 1992. Gerashchenko believed that it was absolutely essential to present 
loss-making enterprises from collapsing. Henceforth his policies were essentially 
devised to assist these enterprises overcoming their chronic financial difficulties, 
with the intent of keeping the economy alive. However, the actual result was that the 
internal deficit' widened in the second quarter of 1992 to 7 8 per cent of GDP and 
reached the peak of 14.6 percent in the third quarter (Skidelsky and Halligan. 1996: 
15) In the view of Skidelsky and Halligan. far from solving the financial difficulties 
of these enterprises, Gerashchenko's policies were quickly leading Russia to 
experience hyperinflation - generally defined as inflation greater than 50 percent per 
month Skidelsky and Halligan also emphasised how the consequent wiping out of 
savings could possibly bring Russia near to a major collapse in demand.
c) ( redils to ( 'ommercial Hanks
Another element of macroeconomic instability depended on the fact that the growth 
rate of money supply was much larger than the growth rate of the monetary base. It is 
true that the CBR in the attempt to control the money multiplier required
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commercial banks to deposit 20 % of their assets, as it is common practice in 
Western economies. These banks could in fact borrow credit from the CBR at the 
refinance rate which was introduced in Russia for the first time. Nonetheless, as the 
real interest rate was extremely negative credit demand was huge and needed to be 
rationed. For that reason - at least in the early stage of transition - the money 
multiplier was mainly a political choice, influenced more by the strength of financial 
lobbies on CBR administrators than by the logic of financial markets (Aslund, 1995: 
188). In quantitative terms, the CBR loans to commercial banks grew from R 134 bn 
on January I 1992 to R 380 bn on May 1
d) FSU Republics 'Technical ( redits ’
Up to now we have described all the internal reasons why in the early 90's Russia 
went through a phase of large monetary expansion. In addition there were also 
considerable external factors which further explain the reasons for the loss of 
monetary control Williamson (1992: 14) described how this process developed:
Under the ancien regime it did not matter very much that the central bank 
automatically monetized the deficits of the republic governments as well as 
the union government, because the union government kept its own deficit 
down and made sure that the republic governments did too But the practice of 
automatic monetary emission was carried over to a situation where the union 
government was letting its own finances deteriorate and the republic 
governments were gaining a large measure of autonomy in their fiscal policy. 
Since most of the costs of monetary emission by any one republic spill over to 
the others under a common monetary system, while the benefits of the deficit 
spending accrue exclusively to the republic that runs a deficit, the system gave 
each individual republic an incentive to run a deficit even though the collective 
consequence was inevitably either repressed or open inflation
26
When the reform government was appointed it must have been immediately clear to 
radical reformers how urgent it was to stop the progressive surge in the growth rate 
of money. As a first step Russia decided to establish control over the emission of 
rouble cash: thereafter cash would partly be used by the Russian Federation and 
partly 'lent' to other republics at a low real interest rate. As Williamson points out 
(1992: 15) these republics were therefore implicitly denied the opportunity "to share 
seigniorage in rouble creation".
However, the FSU central banks could still give credit to their enterprises which in 
tum could be used for buying Russian goods (Goldberg, Ickes and Rvterman. 1994: 
302-303). At the beginning of 1992 the Russian federation established a 
correspondent account system which permitted the monitoring of but not to halt, this 
source of monetary growth. The system functioned as follows (Russian Economic 
Trends, 1992 11: 14)
"The Central Bank established a correspondent account for the Central Bank of 
each former republic of the USSR, starting with an initial balance of zero. All 
banking transactions between republics were to be conducted through these 
accounts, thus making it possible for Russia to monitor which republics were 
running up large deficits based on excessive creation of rouble credits in their 
own republics".
According to Skidelskv and Halligan (1996: 21), at the time of the 1992 Gaidar 
administration, the IMF did not urge the Russian federation to dismantle the rouble 
zone, possibly because "it feared that Russia would repudiate the debts of the Former 
Soviet Union" While it would have been surely difficult to regain monetary control 
straightway, all the further delay meant was that the 'fourth tap' continued to be a 
damaging source of macroeconomic instability
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1.23 The Model
While the immense growth of money supply is certainly at the root of the Russian 
financial crisis, we believe that the story suggested by the overshooting literature is 
not entirely satisfactory in the present context. As a rule we do not think that it is 
appropriate to assume perfect capital mobility for countries under a process of 
economic transition because at the early stages of economic transition, the 
convertibility of the capital account is typically limited, the purpose being to impede 
the development of large capital flights.
Bruno (1993) and Flemming (1993) have recently suggested a simple alternative 
story to account for the existence of widespread and persistent undervaluation in 
Eastern Europe and Russia which focuses on the current account rather than on the 
capital account. Bruno emphasized that market reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Russia were combined with a large degree of current account convertibility, while 
controls to capital account transactions were generally maintained
The desire to establish the convertibility of the domestic currency and create a 
credible foreign exchange market has strong economic reasons, as we have 
previously described. Unsurprisingly, this is the policy which is also commonly 
advised by economic analysts with the clear objective to create proper price signals 
in the economy. Current account convertibility in Russia coincided with the 
abandoning, on the first of July 1992, of the previous chaotic system of multiple 
exchange rates, with the unification of the different exchange rates into one single 
floating rate (see section 1.13).
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However, as emphasized by Bruno, current account convertibility may be dangerous 
in an economy without inflation hedges, as in this case "demand for foreign 
exchange reflects primarily a stock demand” (Bruno,1993: 16). If savers are offered 
negative real interest rates, as indeed in Russia, foreign exchange becomes the onlv 
credible inflation hedge and its demand easily rockets as residents desperately try to 
avoid the cost of inflation. Therefore, if demand for hard currency was to be satisfied 
in some way, a large devaluation of the exchange rate was necessary to improve the 
competitiveness of exporters, and to attract tourists, thus initiating a sustained inflow 
of dollars through the current account.
Flemming (1993: 80-83) similarly indicated how the lack of an inflation hedge 
encourages exporters to hold their foreign exchange. In Russia the process was not 
discouraged bv the system as the existing retention rules allowed the legal possession 
of foreign exchange. We discussed in section 1.13 how these rules conceded that 
exporters could hold onto a certain fraction of their hard currency earnings: 
furthermore, a certain number of enterprises were exempted from these surrender 
requirements. Flemming correctly pointed out that the existing legal inflow of dollars 
required a trade surplus and in turn an undervalued real exchange rate. The 
possession of foreign exchange as a store of value is called by Flemming "internal 
capital flight". This is a common alternative to a real capital flight whenever capital 
account restrictions are in place.
We have tried in this paper to formalise the idea of Bruno and Flemming in a simple 
theoretical context and to develop a model which captures and describes the huge 
changes in the real exchange rate. As mentioned above, for countries in transition the 
assumption of capital account convertibility and perfect capital mobility is
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unrealistic and hence we prefer to choose the alternative notion of currency 
substitution. Following the large literature initiated with the papers by Calvo and 
Rodriguez (1977) and Krugman (1979), we relax the assumption of perfect arbitrage 
between domestic and foreign assets. Conversely, we assume that consumers have a 
portfolio of domestic and foreign assets, and demand a given proportion between 
domestic assets and foreign assets which depend on the difference between their 
expected rate of return.
In order to keep the analysis simple, we rule out the existence of a bond market, as in 
the currency substitution literature, and assume the existence o f only two assets: 
domestic and foreign currency This may be reasonable for a country at an early 
phase of stabilisation, such as Russia, because the budget deficit is in great pan 
financed by credit from the central bank, and not by bonds It is only more recently 
that the Russian government has attempted to finance a fraction o f its deficit through 
open market operations.
The classic currency substitution literature, however, is not always perfectly suitable 
to analyse countries in transition In Krugman's model (1979), for instance, 
purchasing power parity is assumed, although this is not realistic in the context of the 
massive undervaluation experienced in Russia. Eastern Europe and Ukraine The 
analysis of Calvo and Rodriguez (1977) does not suffer from this drawback, as the 
assumption of purchasing power parity is relaxed In their model they postulate 
instantaneous price flexibility in the non-tradable sector, while, in this theoretical 
model, we prefer to maintain, as in the Dornbusch (1976) type of models, the 
assumption of a greater rigidity of the price level than the exchange rate
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We try to combine together two different strands of literature, namely the original 
currency substitution literature and the notion of price rigidity of the Dombusch 
model. We believe this allows us to analyse, although in a rather simplified 
framework, the impact of monetary policy on economies in transition.
The standard currency substitution assumption is that the ratio of money to the value 
of dollars depends negatively on the difference in the rate of returns of the two 
currencies (e g. Calvo and Rodriguez. 1977: 620, Krugman. 1992: 314, Morris, 1995: 
302). Given that in the present context we relax the assumption of purchasing power 
parity, the difference in the rate of return between the two types of currencies is not 
inflation but the rate of change in the exchange rate
The exchange rate .v is defined as the price of foreign currency, m is the quantity of 
money in the economy while x is the quantity of dollars Therefore, we can 
formulate this convenient functional form.
ds
1.1) m -  s -  ,r = -A  —
dl
which describes to what extent, if agents anticipate a future devaluation of the 
exchange rate, their response is to reduce the proportion between money and dollars 
(valued in terms of domestic currency) in their portfolio''.
In this context it is implicitly assumed that desired money holdings are negatively related to the rate of 
change in the exchange rate and positively related to wealth -— • = where wealth is
defined as the sum of real money balances and the real value of dollars, W — 
example, Krugman, 1992 3 14-316 and Morris, 1995 302)
M SX---- 1-----
/ ' r
(see, for
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We also assume that prices, p , adjust sluggishly according to a typical Phillips curve 
dynamics,
1.2 ) x = LJE- = p(x- p)+ n
where a devaluation in the real exchange rate stimulates demand and initiates an 
inflationary process. Inflation also depends on expectations, proxied by the growth 
rate of money, t] (core inflation).
The last necessary step to close the model is to specify a relationship for the supplv 
of dollars When the capital account is not convertible, the only source of foreign 
exchange is the revenue gained by exporters and the hard currency brought in by 
tourists. Hence, we assume, as in Krugman and in Calvo and Rodriguez models, that 
a positive rate of accumulation of foreign exchange in the domestic economy 
requires a trade balance surplus. "This follows from the assumption that foreign 
currency is the only internationally traded asset; if securities were included and 
allowed to be traded then the foreign exchange could be instantaneously acquired 
through sales of securities abroad" (Calvo and Rodriguez, 1977: 619)
In turn, the trade balance depends positively on the real exchange rate, and therefore. 
1.3) —— = fx(s  -  p )CU
the rate of accumulation ofdollars is a positive function of the real exchange rate
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Equations 1.1), 1.2) and 1.3) complete the model whose structure is hence quite 
simple. In the steady state the inflation and devaluation rate match the growth rate of 
money and the amount of foreign exchange in the economy is fixed (i.e. the degree 
of dollarisation of the economy is constant):
_ </v_ n
Furthermore, it can be seen from equations 1.2) and 1.3) that the real exchange rate, 
v- p  is the only variable affecting both inflation, n  and the rate of accumulation of
, d x
foreign exchange, — . Thus the determinant of the system is zero: this at first mav dt
seem a complicating feature of the model; on the contrary, it allows a reduction of 
the system from three differential equations to two equations hence simplifying the 
model without losing its basic insight.
To verify this let us consider that it is possible to formulate the rate of accumulation 
of dollars as in the following expression:
1 4> ~ - = - p p ' ( n - *)Lit
Henceforth, integrating equation 1.4) we determine that the amount o f foreign 
exchange present in the domestic economy as a linear function of real balances:
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1.5) x = - p p ' ( m - p ) +  A
where A is the constant of integration. Assuming for simplicity that the initial values 
of x,m ,p  are equal to zero:
.v0 = mu = pn = 0
it follows, as a consequence, that the constant of integration is also equal to zero:
A = 0
The next step of the analysis is to define the real exchange rate as:
1.6) c = s -  p
which also implies that the rate of change of the real exchange rate is equal to:
1.7)
Jl _ els 
dl dl
It now becomes straightforward to reduce our model into a system of two differential 
equations
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18 )
dx
Hi
lie
Hi
0
r' + rV'V r 1
/y r 0
- p  L - n
in terms of the two most relevant variables of the model, namely the stock of foreign 
exchange held by the private sector, x and the real exchange rate, c .
The steady state is characterised by the two following expressions:
The first of the two equations suggests that an increase in the rate of growth of 
money leads to a steady state increase in foreign exchange. While the second 
equation suggests that the real exchange rate eventually returns to its equilibrium 
value in the long run
From the technical point of view the system is standard, as it is linear, the 
determinant is negative and the solution is unambiguously a saddle point We can 
represent the dynamic system in two phase diagrams (see Fig. 1.3 and Fig. 1.4), 
which corresponds to the two alternative cases depending on whether the line of
stability, = 0 has positive or negative slope (Calvo and Rodriguez. 1977: 621-
19)
1. 10)
J t
622).
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In both cases the motion of x in the plane is obvious as long as we bear in mind that 
a net accumulation of foreign assets requires an economy with a positive real 
exchange rate, e > 0  (equation 1.3). On the same plane the direction of the arrows 
describe the dynamics of the real exchange rate, c .
Although the two pictures are different, they have the helpful common feature that 
for both the stable manifold SS is negatively sloped . If we refer to p , as the stable
given by the following expressions:
We can now examine what the effects are of a change in monetary policy and to 
verify whether our original insight was correct (see Figure 1.5). If there is a higher 
monetary expansion, one expects dollar holdings to increase, which requires the 
stable manifold to shift up to the right from SS to TT. But dollar holdings, .r, is a 
sluggish variable, so the exchange rate,c , has to jump to guarantee the long run 
stability of the system. 7
7 Hence in both cases the motion of the variables rule out the “undershooting” case
f i d
1. 12)
where the slope of the stable manifold is: 0 = —p
P
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Hence, the initial response of the real exchange rate to an unexpected monetary 
expansion is an instantaneous devaluation from point A to point B The dynamics of 
the system also suggests that over time the economy will gradually slide from point 
B to reach point D, which is the new steady state.
From the above figure we see how this currency substitution story help shed light on 
the phenomenon described by Bruno and Flemming as internal capital flight. When 
the government decides to expand the growth rate of money, there will be an 
increase of inflation and of the rate of devaluation in the exchange rate in the steady 
state. As agents attempt to defend themselves from the forthcoming losses, their 
demand for foreign exchange increases, requiring a net accumulation of foreign 
assets. If this demand is to be satisfied, the real exchange rate must rapidly
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depreciate to attract tourists and favour exporters, and to remain weak for enough 
time to allow the process of dollarisation to continue until agents fully satisfy their 
portfolio demand tor foreign exchange. Thus agents are able to to substitute for local 
currency into dollars not through capital account but via the current - which is what 
meant by saying that the capital flight is internal.
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1.3 Adjustment of Real Exchange Rate, Liquidity and 
Dollar Holdings: the Russian Experience
It is the purpose of this section to examine whether the model is useful to illustrate 
the Russian economic experience In the light of the data problem attending the first 
few months and years of independence we resort largely to a graphical analysis.
At any rate econometric analysis would be difficult to use in a context such as this. 
In first place the stock of foreign exchange held by the private sector is not directly 
observable (Morris, 1995: 310). Also, during the period between the end of 1991 and 
July 1992. the Russian economy was subject to frequent changes in foreign exchange 
rules (see section 1.13)
Briefly summarising, the macroeconomie model presented in section 1.23 suggests 
that a higher rate of monetary growth brings about an immediate sizable 
deterioration of the real exchange rate. This allows for the increased demand for 
foreign currency to be progressively satisfied, via an improved trade balance
The real auction and black-market exchange rates for Moscow markets, based on 
Russian Economic Trends data, are presented in Fig. 1.6. The available sample 
period begins on April 1991s .
For reasons discussed in section 113, we believe that auction data overestimates the 
weakness of the real exchange rate during the first half of 1992. Nevertheless, as it 
can be seen, the pattern for the two time series is similar. *
* A discussion on real auction and black-market exchange rates before April 1991 is found in Goldberg 
(1992:12-15) based on data from the Moscow publication ( 'om m ersan t.
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Observe that the real value of the rouble sharply declined at the end of 1991. This 
lends support to the view that the loss of monetary control during the final months of 
the Soviet Union triggered the collapse of the Russian currency.
Thereafter in real terms the rouble steadily began to get stronger until it finally 
recovered more than it had initially lost. The real exchange rate appreciated 
particularly strongly, to start with, in January 1992. The reason for this can be 
accounted for by Gaidar’s decision to liberalize prices in that same month, hence 
determining a one off jump in prices, with monthly inflation reaching up 245 °o - 
well above the 50 % hyperinflation threshold (see Fig. 1.6). Since then the real 
exchange rate has undergone a more gradual process of appreciation, only temporary 
reversed each time financial markets perceived that policy-makers once more were 
losing control over monetary policy.
This sequence of events is broadly consistent with the model prediction that the real 
exchange rate should jump up just as soon as monetary policy is unexpectedly 
relaxed: under these circumstances economic agents revise up their inflationary 
expectations, switching further their portfolio investments towards hard currencies. 
Such a sudden new extra demand requires a supplementary depreciation of the 
exchange rate to allow the necessary inflow of foreign assets
This is what presumably happened, for example, on July 17 1992 when Viktor 
Gerashchenko - already well known for his inclination to expansionary monetary 
policies - was appointed as chair of the CBR ’. As Aslund (1995: 191) reports:
'in  Goldman's words "In Russia, paradoxically, it was the prime minister who fought for monetary 
restraint, while the Central Bank director was determined to print up hoards of money so that he could 
fund the operations of the large state enterprises" (1996 107)
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"Soon thereafter it was decided to net out interenterprise arrears and cover the 
balance with state credits. In June, credit started flowing in all directions: to 
agriculture and industry; to other FSRs; and to the budget, because of 
increasing subsidies. The domestic budget deficit peaked during the third 
quarter at 14.6 percent of GDP on a cash basis. The money supply (M2) 
increased by no less than 28 percent per month during the five months from 
June to October 1992.”
By carefully examining the time series presented in Fig. 1.6, we see how the real 
exchange rate again peaked up in October 1992. Thus, this empirical observation 
seems to be in line with the model prediction on exchange rate movements and. of 
course, more in general, with all the overshooting literature111.
A different story, yet consistent with our model, took place on October I Ith 1994 
when the rouble suddenly collapsed by 28 %. The economic causes for such a 
harmful exchange rate plunge can be traced back to the previous summer when 
ministers had been incapable of holding out against the 'constant pleas' coming from 
both the influential agricultural and industrial lobbies (Financial Times, 1994a: 25). 
The following report (Russian Economic Trends, 1994 3.3: 32) is an apt description 
of subsequent events:
“The period from August to mid-October was one of sharp destabilization on 
the foreign exchange market. There were two underlying reasons for this 
development. Firstly, a loose monetary policy during the second quarter and 
secondly, a large, one-off centralized credit emission of R 13 bn around the 
end of July for agriculture supplies to the Northern territories and other state 
needs. This money started to exert pressure on the foreign exchange market in
"'in a recent article Halpern and Wyploz (1995) convincingly argue how real exchange rates in a 
transition economy should revalue to match possible improvements in overall factor productivity Their 
empirical results suggest that for most of the Eastern European countries the exchange rate was 
definitely weaker than the predicted equilibrium real exchange rate This confirms the point emphasized 
by the overshooting literature that the exchange rate adjusts also for financial reasons' and not just 
because of changes in the real economy
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August ; but the CBR managed to keep the situation under control with the 
help of massive dollar interventions. In September the pressure on the rouble 
continued and the CBR decided to let the exchange rate run faster than 
inflation and thus to allow the real exchange rate to find it new equilibrium 
level. This resulted in the jumps of the exchange rate on September 22 and 27- 
28. However, at the beginning of October the CBR lost control over the 
exchange rate and with reserves running low were unable to prevent ‘Black 
Tuesday’ on October 11, when the exchange rate fell by 28 %, jumping from 
R3000 to R4000 in one day.”
The large devaluation of the rouble cannot be visually identified by looking at the 
monthly time series of the real exchange rate. The reason is that immediately after 
the rouble collapsed, Boris Yeltsin asked for the resignation of both Mr Sergei 
Dubinin, the Acting Finance minister and of, Viktor Gerashchenko, Chairman of the 
Central Bank. Such a quick response was seen, and understood by financial markets, 
as a signal that the President was truly determined to quickly reverse the summer 
expansionary macroeconomic policies. Without further delay, a number of economic 
measures were implemented with the clear intent to reduce the money multiplier As 
a consequence - in line with the predictions suggested by our currency substitution 
model11 *- the next day the Russian rouble (Financial Times, 1994b 18)
"staged a startling recovery climbing 20 per cent against the dollar. Its rise 
prompted currency traders to break out into spontaneous applause on the floor 
of the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX)”
We have looked at the time paths for the real exchange rate. Now we focus on 
whether dollar holdings in Russia behaved as our story has suggested. Admittedly it 
is less easy to verify what was the stock of dollars in Russia during the early 90's. As 
we saw, according to our model dollar holdings rise in response to an increase in the
11 In terms of Fig 1 5. competitiveness first jumps up because of a higher monetary expansion from
point A to point B only to jump back because of the sacking of the Central Bank governor
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growth rate of monetary emission. It is, however, almost impossible to obtain 
ftliable data about the actual dollarisation of the Russian economy as to a large 
extent private cash holdings depend on illegal flows. We have already emphasised, 
on the other hand, that it was legal to hold dollar deposits in Russian commercial 
banks (see section 1.13). These deposits could then be thought of as a proxy 
measuring the extent of dollar holdings in Russia (see Calvo and Vegh, 1992: 21). By 
plotting these data in the following Fig. 1.7 there seems to be some evidence that the 
stock of dollars in the Russian economy increased during the early years of radical 
reforms12.
Unfortunately this proxy is critically influenced by changes in legislation rule 
regarding hard currency possession. Despite the 'statistical' unreliability of these 
data let us nevertheless cross plot competitiveness against dollar deposits in Russian 
commercial banks As it can be seen from Fig 1.8, there is some indication for the 
existence of a negative relationship between competitiveness and the stock of dollars 
in Russia Observe, in fact, that the depicted path closely corresponds to the 
negatively sloped stable manifold SS previously derived from our model1' 14.
As a final cross check, let us complete our graphic analysis by examining whether 
the stock of dollars in Russia and real balances were really negatively correlated.
1' Compare the trendline to equation 111
"T he slope of this regression, equal to -0 45, is significant at the 1% level As we have only 22 
monthly observations, and given the quality of the data, it is not possible to carry out a correct 
cointegration analysis to verity whether this regression is spurious Black market data cannot be 
employed because the sample period is too short
14 Reality, of course, is much more complex than what is assumed in this simplified framework by all 
means one cannot simply say that the growth rate o f money was increased from one constant rate to 
another higher rate However, it would be possible to obtain the same picture with an anticipated time- 
dependent increase in the growth rate of money
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There is some - although not conclusive - indication that indeed economic agents 
associated dollar holdings increases to reductions in real balances (see Fig. 1.9) To 
further examine whether the model correctly explains the reasons for the Russian 
exchange rate undervaluation, it is appropriate to verify whether the Russian 
economy was actually characterised by a trade surplus. One point should be 
immediately clear: once again the available data are not fully reliable for several 
reasons. Firstly, because up to 1991 statistics were largely gathered and expressed 
relative to the Soviet Union economy; while conversely from 1992 onwards the 
control of statistical data became the responsibility of each republic. Consider how 
the simple change in national frontiers re-classified several transactions within the 
USSR as trade. Secondly, from 1992 all trade dealings were accounted in terms of 
dollars and no longer in terms of transferable roubles. Finally, and most importantly, 
official data did not take into account that exporters still had a strong incentive to 
divert hard currency revenues away from official exchange rate markets (Russian 
Economic Trends. 1994 3.1 ‘Special Report on Trade' 81). Nonetheless by 
examining these data, it appears that in the early 90's Russia was experiencing a 
visible trade surplus (Table I 3).
T a b le  1.3 R ussian  T rade B alance in Sbn
1991 1992 1993 1994
export 53.2 41.6 46.3 494
import 45.1 37.2 34.3 39.6
trade balance 8.1 4.4 11.9 9.8
(Source Russian Economic Trends 1996 5.1 )
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Back in 1990 the Russian economy had still a trade deficit. However, as a 
consequence of the collapse of the CMEA trade system, the Russian economy 
underwent a progressive fall in both exports and imports. Consider, to start with, that 
export revenues kept on falling in spite of extremely favourable terms of trade in the 
oil sector. According to Aslund (1995: 145) between 1990 and 1991, for example, 
exports fell roughly by 28 %. But imports fell even more rapidly as they plunged on 
that same year by 46 %! This could be partly explained by the recession but partly it 
was also the direct consequence of the USSR default on debt payments and of the 
sudden halt in foreign credit.
Thus, the above documented trade surplus seems to give some support to our model. 
Of course the real story is much more complex. To begin with Russia was 
experiencing a substantial deficit on services and therefore current account data were 
much less favourable than trade data In addition, there is some evidence that in the 
early 90's Russia has been a net exporter of flight capital (Russian Economic Trends. 
1996 5.1) To some extent, thus, Russia was experiencing an actual capital flight as 
well as the internal capital flight discussed by Moreover the model does not take 
into account that Russia could partly rely on debt deferral which effectively lessened 
the need for an immediate trade surplus. All this granted, we nevertheless think that 
this model - especially when unofficial smuggling is accounted for - correctly 
captures the notion that the rouble had to be substantially undervalued to allow the 
necessary building up of hard currency stocks1' 15
15 Consider how (he Russian Balance of Payments was equal to the following accounting identity 
Current Account Surplus Capital Outflows Increase in Otlietal Reserves - Debt Deferral + Internal Capital Flmht 
In our model implicitly we had accepted the simplifying assumptions that
Capital outflow - Debt Deferral + Increase in Reserves -  0 and, additionaly, that there was no deficit
on services Hence the result is
Trade Surplus Internal Capital Flight
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1.4 Export Taxes
In the previous paragraphs we described how the Russian economy experienced a 
great undervaluation of the exchange rate. The main thrust of our analysis was that 
the weakness of the rouble allowed the necessary accumulation of foreign currency 
in the presence of expansionary monetary policies. Emphasis has also been placed on 
how the exchange rate weakness was larger at the initial stage of economic 
adjustment. Henceforth the domestic economy was for some time exposed to foreign 
speculators and to corrupt bureaucrats "as there was an enormous incentive to gain 
access to products like oil and export them” (Goldman 1996:114; see also Aslund 
1995: 150, The Economist (1994) and The Sunday Times "The Great Rouble Scam” 
(1994)).
Given such an economic background, at the start of reform the Russian political 
system was under considerable pressure to reinforce administrative controls on 
exports or, alternatively, to introduce export taxes. The reason was the widespread 
anxiety that the whole domestic economy would be re-oriented to foreign export 
markets at the expenses of the internal domestic market. Among all possible options 
the government was aware that export taxes were - if properly implemented - an 
excellent source of revenue for financing the budget deficit and for reducing 
monetary' emission It was then one of the main objectives of Russian radical 
reformers to progressively substitute the complex system of quotas and licenses with 
exports taxes.
As discussed earlier, Russian foreign exchange markets were liberalised with a 
gradual strategy: at the beginning of 1992 the government decided to abolish the
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existing chaotic system of multiple currency coefficients and to introduce implicit 
export taxes by imposing a renewed structure of surrender rules. Soon thereafter the 
authorities sought to impose explicit taxes as well (Aslund, 1995: 150):
"A novelty for 1992 was that exporters had to pay export taxes (fixed in ECU). 
The export tariffs were supposed to tax most of the difference between the 
domestic price and the world price but these tariffs met with vehement 
opposition. Exporters sought exemptions and evaded export taxes on a broad 
scale. The number of exporters were too large to be monitored."
In the intentions of the legislator export taxes would thus maintain a wedge between 
domestic and foreign prices, especially in strategic sectors such as raw materials. 
Unfortunately the system proved on several occasions to be exposed to frauds and 
distortions, sometimes directly caused by legislative and bureaucratic confusion1"
It is not easy to assess what was the size and the trend of this wedge. For example in 
July 1992 the export tax on raw materials was increased from 20 to 40 percent; but at 
the same time the surrender requirement rules were substantially reduced: hence the 
overall effective tax rate remained practically unchanged (Russian Economic Trends 
1992 I 2). Consider also how in theory state enterprises of raw materials were not 
subject to export taxes but in practice all revenues ultimately ended up to the 
treasury (Aslund 1995 150).
Empirical issues apart, in the early 90’s the Russian economy was increasingly 
becoming characterised by (implicit or explicit) taxes on exports - to defend the 
availability of domestic goods and for state revenue purposes Referring back to the 
model described earlier, let us now assume that the trade balance is not only a
"’For example, Goldman (1906 243) says that "in mid-1993 the theoretical tax rate of the combined 
total of the different taxes levied on exporters exceeded 120 percent o f profits"
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positive function of the real exchange rate, c but it is also a negative function of 
export taxes, u ' A sketch solution is illustrated by the following Fig. 1.10:
F ig . 1.10 The Jo in t Effect of a H ig h e r Rate of M onetary  Expansion 
an d  an  Export Tax on C om petitiveness and  Liquidity
.. A
u
D
/x
Once again, suppose that political authorities decide on a higher monetary emission 
and on an increase in export taxation. This broadly captures the 1992 Russian 
experience. As before, the impact effect is a massive devaluation of the real
dsm -  x -  .x = - a. — 
dt
rt = fix -  n -it)  + n
C =  U
where the steady state is hence equal to .t =
Arj -  u
\ + p m '
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exchange rate with the economy jumping from point A to point B. Subsequently, the 
economy gradually tends to the new steady state, D, bv sliding along the stable 
manifold: during that time period there is a net accumulation of foreign exchange 
while, contemporaneously, the real exchange rate undergoes a process of 
appreciation.
The interesting point of all this is that, under these circumstances, the real exchange 
rate does not converge to zero, since in the steady state a permanent wedge persists. 
This suggests that as long as the government maintains export taxes (or similarly 
import taxes) the nominal exchange rate does not return to its PPP value.
In light of the Russian experience, these considerations help explain the empirical 
observation that in recent years the rouble appreciated but remained quite far from 
its PPP value. According to official statistics (Russian Economic Trends 1995 5.1: 
35), in fact, the rouble averaged approximately 2 88 in 1994 and 2.13 in 1995 times 
the estimated PPP value.
One has to add that the rouble strengthening somehow reduced the scope for taxing 
exports, as exporters started losing competitiveness in foreign exchange markets 
Reductions in taxes, nevertheless, were not easy to accomplish given that the 
Russian government still needed to keep up revenues The debate over export taxes 
was hence becoming one of the most important Helds of economic discussion The 
following report shows how the dismantling of export taxes was undoubtedly a slow 
and difficult process (Russian Economic Trends, 1995 4.2: 71):
From October 1 export taxes were reduced on a number of exported 
commodities, the impetus behind this change was the appreciation of the
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rouble which has hurt exporters of these commodities. The tax reduction cover 
a wide range of goods, but do not include key export commodities such as 
crude oil, natural gas, copper nickel. There are two reasons for this: firstly 
prices on international markets are now favourable for these commodities than 
they were 18 months ago, offsetting the impact o the rouble appreciation. 
Secondly, for fiscal reasons the government wanted to avoid decreasing export 
taxes on these goods. The export tax on oil is currently being debated, and the 
export tax written into the 1996 budget is 14 ECU per tonne (it was 20 ECU 
per tonne). Besides this the government plans to eliminate all export taxes on 
ferrous metals and chemical products by the end of the year, and to abolish 
export taxes for petroleum products (except for the heating oil) from December 
1 1995. No changes are expected for export taxes on basic non-ferros metals
The process of reduction in export taxation has continued in recent times, not just 
because of the lobbying pressure coming from exporters but also because of the 
conditional deals agreed with the IMF. The IMF, in fact, urged Russia to 
progressively dismantle export taxes in order to expose its economy to the right price 
signals and to free it from all frauds and distortions18 According to our model the 
partial removal of export taxes should have determined a greater process of 
convergence of the rouble to its PPP values. The last data at our disposal suggests 
that in January 1996 the rouble was worth only 1.6 times the estimated PPP parity 
This seems to be broadly consistent with the predictions of the model
lxFor sake of simplicity we assumed an internal foreign exchange market characterised by a freely 
floating exchange rate without foreign exchange leakages However, there are circumstances when 
foreign exchange leakages between two separate markets, the official and the informal, may turn out to 
be substantial See Goldberg (1995 167-187) and chapter 4 of this thesis for a formal account of a 
two-tier exchange rate model
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1.5 Hyperinflation and Seigniorage
The analysis presented so far is able to predict what are the consequences of an 
exogenous increase in the growth rate of money on the real exchange rate and on the 
stock of foreign exchange held by the private sector in a transition economy 
characterised by currency substitution. However, the real question to be addressed is 
whether monetary authorities of financially weak countries should choose a high 
growth rate of money supply or not.
It is a well known fact that in the Western world a very small fraction of public debt 
is money financed while, conversely, in several macroeconomically unstable 
economies seigniorage remains the only source of financement.
The government is in fact able to "extract resources by reducing the value of the 
outstanding stock of base money, so that the private sector has to save more in order 
to maintain its wealth" (Russian Economic Trends, 1993 2.1: 19). It has long since 
been recognised that the need to finance a large debt with seigniorage, rather than 
with the emission of bonds, is the main reason for the development of an 
hyperinflationarv process.
The traditional literature on seigniorage, which initiated with the influential work of 
Cagan (1956) in the fifties, attempted to explain the reason why hyperinflation 
episodes might take place According to this literature, hyperinflationary monetary 
policies should not be thought over as irrational for the reason that they are 
deliberately chosen by political authorities with the intent to increase seigniorage.
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Henceforth the analysis seems to suggest that hyperinflation should be thought of as 
an unpleasant but necessary consequence to the desire of financing the budget with 
seigniorage.
In this paragraph we review the main argument of this literature by postulating a 
conventional money demand function which is assumed to depend negatively on the 
nominal interest rate:
1.13) m — p  = —ki  
Suppose also that the real interest rate.
1.14) i r = / -  n'’
is constant and equal to zero
Seigniorage is then defined as the growth rate of money, r/ . multiplied by the real 
stock of money base:
115) Z = rj—
P
and it is hence a function of both the growth rate of money and of expected inflation,
rt' ' :
116) z=n*~"’'
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In a stable economy where expected inflation, inflation and the growth rate of money 
are all equal:
1.17) jce = k = q
seigniorage can then be formulated, for example, as a simple function of the growth 
rate of money:
118 ) S  =  rje~*n
which graphically has the Laffer curve shape: (Fig 111)
F ig . 1.11 T he Laffer Curve 
Z A
n
Under the hypothesis of economic stability it is clear that the optimal growth rate of 
money which maximises seigniorage is equal to the inverse of the semi-elasticity of 
money demand:
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1.19) 7 = ~rA.
Clearly the increase in seigniorage is constrained insofar as the rise in the growth 
rate of money leads to a reduction in real money demand.
As a matter of fact there exists a large amount of literature on empirical estimation 
of the maximum seigniorage growth rate of money. For example, Budina et al. 
(1995) estimated the Cagan model to arrive at the conclusion that the optimal growth 
rate for the Czech Republic is about 20%.
In spite of all these considerations, Cagan has suggested that provided the 
government is ready to accept an unstable macroeconomic system, it can obtain a 
much greater segniorage than the maximum of the Laffer curve. The central notion 
of his analysis is that the government may take advantage of economic agents slow 
response to policy changes Seigniorage may, in fact, reach any desired amount by 
sufficiently increasing the growth rate of money: the reason is that economic agents 
need time to reduce their money demand. For example, we previously showed how 
Russian real balances remained high for a long time, following a slow downward 
path. There are two reasons why velocity of money did not increase more rapidly: 
firstly, because people required some time to economise on cash holdings; secondly, 
state enterprises generally relied more on additional credits from the Central Bank 
rather than on trying to speed up payments procedures to shirk their working capital 
The uncertain legal system also meant it was hard to collect payments, because there 
were no penalties for any delay (Aslund 1995: 5).
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At some stage, however, Russian citizens managed to substantially reduce money
seigniorage it has to keep on choosing a higher rate of monetary expansion. A 
vicious circle gets started in which the government keeps on increasing the growth 
rate of money, whilst at the same time money demand - which can be thought as the 
tax base of seigniorage - progressively shrinks. Cagan's analysis suggests that this is 
the plausible mechanism of how hyperinflation gets started20.
Returning now to our currency substitution model, let us now calculate seigniorage, 
once more defined as:
which allows us to calculate seigniorage as a function of the rate of growth of money 
supply alone:
1' In Russia enterprises started asking tor prepayments
'" The validity of Cagan's insight has been questioned by the more recent literature on seigniorage 
Buiter (l')87 l l l - l  18) and Bruno e Fisher (IWO 353-374). maintaining the formal framework of 
Cagan, with the difference of postulating "rational" rather than adaptive expectations, were able to 
show that the original results of Cagan are not robust Under rational expectations, in fact, the model 
suggests that a high level of seigniorage does not require hyperinflationary but rather hyperdetlationary 
monetary policies
demand1 : at that point if the government decides to sustain the increase in
Taking the logarithm of the previous expression we obtain the following:
1.20 ) r  = log // + m -  p
1.21)
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If the only objective of the government were to maximise seigniorage in the steady 
state, the government would then choose the following growth rate of monev:
The analysis of the model above hence suggests that for an economy without capital 
account convertibility, the rate of growth of money which maximises steadv state
Here too, just as in Cagan's model, let us consider what are the consequences if the 
government unexpectedly chooses to increase the growth rate of money more than 
the optimal steady state level. From Fig. 112 it becomes intuitive how in the short 
run seigniorage, 7. would be higher as the economy is at point D instead of being at 
point A. This has a long run cost in terms of seigniorage, as over time the economy 
slides to point E rather than to point B. But if the government has a large positive 
discount rate, it is not too concerned about it.
The ultimate consequence - sooner or later - is that seigniorage falls because of the 
progressive reduction of real balances. Hence, Cagan's analysis suggests that to 21
21 In this currency substitution context the consequence to a net inflow of foreign assets is the larger 
demand for cash
1.22)
seigniorage is higher than in the standard case: l . Flovvever, for the special case of 
1.1 = 0 the traditional solution is found again:
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sustain the level of seigniorage the government has to keep on ehoosing a higher rate 
of monetary expansion and to allow an hyperinflationary process to take place.
F ig. 1.12 S hort-R un Incentive to a H igher Rate of M oneta ry  Growth
Z A i = 0
Let us now describe what happens with our currency substitution model if the 
government unexpectedly keeps on increasing the growth rate of money to sustain 
seigniorage. As it can be seen from Fig. 1.13 each time the growth rate of money is 
increased the stable manifold moves upwards The exchange rate remains 
undervalued - by jumping up to points as B and E. The undervaluation of the 
exchange rate allows economic agents to lind relief from the hyperinflationary 
process with a continuous accumulation of foreign assets. The economv thus 
becomes progressively dollarised to the point when it is virtually impossible to 
extract seigniorage (Fisher, 1982: 295)
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Fig. 1.13 The C onsequences of High S eigniorage on In te rn a l C apital 
Flight
„ A
B
E
A O F
There is one important final observation to make: all the above considerations, inspired 
by Cagan's analysis, implicitly assume that economic agents are not able to foresee the 
government's intention to repeatedly increase the rate of monetary expansion In other 
words economic agents are assumed to be naive. The first question which needs to he 
asked in the next chapters then is: what would have happen if economic agents were 
instead rational'.’ and a second one. closely related to the Russian experience, is: was it 
really the best possible option to appoint a Central Banker, as Gerashchenko, whose 
priority was not to fight against inflation but rather to subsidize loss making 
enterprises’
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1.6 Final Remarks
In this chapter, there is a description of how, in a relatively short time, Russia moved 
to a system of current account convertibility, liberalised prices and favourable 
retention rules, the purpose being to bring most of the economy back to legal 
channels. Certainly, this was not an easy set of policies to carry out. considering the 
sudden breakdown of monetary control in the rouble zone and the extent to which 
official prices had been repressed.
The essence of the discussion proposed in this essay is that when faced with severe 
tight controls on capital, agents are able to substitute for local currency into foreign 
valuta via the current account - which is what is meant by saying that capital flight is 
internal. This helps shed some light on why in the early 90‘s the Russian foreign 
exchange markets have experienced a time of great turbulence
The currency substitution approach here developed yields two interesting insights, 
which are both broadly consistent with the Russian experience: the first is the 
weakness of the exchange rate, which basically reflects a large huge stock demand 
for foreign exchange; the second is the improvement in the external position of the 
country, which triggers the necessary accumulation of foreign exchange.
The model combines price stickiness and currency substitution, and can be reduced 
to a linear system of two differential equations Most important of all. from a formal 
perspective, is that the dynamics of the model are simple, allowing one to extend this
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research while maintaining the same theoretical framework” . In the following 
chapters of the present thesis, joint examination of several macroeconomic themes, 
such as price stickiness, currency substitution and time consistency, provides 
additional insights for the Russian experience of undervaluation
In this essay we have also investigated the role of export taxation. The Russian 
authorities were aware that export taxes were an excellent source of revenue for 
financing the budget deficit, and considering the great weakness of the real exchange 
rate, the imposition of these taxes appeared to be particularly attractive
Using our basic model, we have arrived at the intuitive conclusion that, as long as 
the government maintains export taxes, the nominal exchange rate does not converge 
to its PPP value. Over time, however, the currency strengthening reduces the scope 
for taxing exports, as the export sector starts losing competitiveness in foreign 
exchange markets.
Finally we have reviewed Cagan's explanation of why financially weak countries 
may decide on a high rate of monetary expansion The key notion of this research is 
that the government may take advantage of economic agents slow response to policy 
changes When a country prints money to finance a large deficit, the government has 
to repeatedly increase the growth rate of money, and allow a hyperinflationary 
process to take place. In a situation such as the one described here, a further 
consequence of this is the progressive economy dollarisation It should be said, 
however, that this analysis implicitly supposes a naive response of agents to changes
"  In the following chapters we show how a natural extention of the Dornbusch model, the Buiter 
Miller model, has a dynamic structure which is very similar to the currency subtitution model just 
presented This feature proves to be helpful, because it shows how the absence of perfect capital 
mobility changes the economic insight but not the dynamic properties of the overshooting literature
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in policy instruments. To provide additional insights to the research presented so far, 
we intend therefore to include, in the course of this thesis, the time inconsistency 
constraint to this analytical framework.
6ft
Chapter 2
T im e C onsistency  in  a n  O pen  Econom y, a-la-
D ornbusch
2.1 Introduction
That expectations of the future monetary policies play a key role in determining the 
evolution of macroeconomic variables has long since been recognised by economic 
theorists. This is especially true for macroeconomically unstable countries that rely 
largely on money financing, because in such circumstances there is an excellent 
motive for choosing a high rate of monetary expansion
The aim of the present essay is to assess the behaviour of the real exchange rate, 
inflation and liquidity in an open economy setting characterised by financial markets 
with rational expectations. With rational expectation, loose monetary policies in the 
future have important current consequences. As will become clear later on. the key 
conclusions of this study broadly apply to Russia's recent experience of 
macroeconomic instability. However, as our exercise is primarily theoretical, it can 
similarly provide interesting insights on several other financially distressed countries.
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Our discussion starts by referring the reader to section 1.5 of Exchange Rale 
Undervaluation in the Absence o f  Perfect Capital Mobility: the Russian Case, where 
we had briefly reviewed the standard hyperinflation analysis. Our understanding of 
Cagan's model is that hyperinflationary monetary policies are interpreted by such 
theory as a deliberate choice of a government whose objective is to take advantage of 
money demand slow response in order to increase seigniorage. Implicitly, henceforth, 
this approach either assumes that expectations are adaptive or, alternatively, that 
money demand adjusts according to a process of partial adjustment.
As a rule, however, agents who operate in an unstable economic environment are all 
too conscious of the possible costs of holding real balances. They are certainly aware 
that the government may choose an inflationary monetary policy to finance the deficit 
with seigniorage.
This essay proceeds as follows. In the next section 2.2 we will focus on an alternative 
interpretation of hyperinflation, suggested by Barro (1983), which is consistent with 
the hypothesis of rational expectations. The main economic insight of this literature is 
that an important aspect of macroeconomically unstable economies is given by the 
lack of credibility of policy makers. Under this setting economic agents foresee 
whether policy makers are prepared to accept high inflation in order to earn a large 
seigniorage. Despite the commitment of a future tight monetary policy, economic 
agents take into account of the great difficulties for financing the budget and hence 
correctly foresee the real future monetary policies: consequently their response is to 
reduce money demand, as soon as possible
We present a simplified version of Barro's model which is capable of capturing the 
above described economic insight. We will see that this is yet another application of 
the time inconsistency analytical framework. As in the standard time inconsistency
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literature, the gist of the matter is that credibility can be enhanced by delegating 
control of monetary policy to a conservative central banker. Greater credibility 
allows, in fact, a reduced need to economise on real balances.
However, Barro's model is particularly simple because it assumes a closed economy 
and a constant real interest rate. To be able to apply such analysis to the Russian 
economic experience, it is therefore necessary to investigate these issues in an open 
economy setting.
With this objective in mind, in section 2.3 we formally review the classical 
Dombusch literature. This highly influential work has emphasised the significance of 
a different speed of adjustment between the financial and the goods market. The 
exchange rate is indeed assumed to be a forward looking variable, which adjusts 
immediately by anticipating the future monetary policies that the government will 
adopt. Conversely real balances are assumed to be a sluggish variable. We believe 
that this correctly captures the Russian economic experience for the following two 
reasons:
1) on one hand, it seems rather likely that financial markets were able to anticipate 
the early 90‘s expansionary monetary policies. It was not. by all means, hard to 
foresee that the 'four taps' - which we discussed about in section 1.22 - would 
continue to determine large increases in money supply; 2
2) on the other hand, we also clarified, that for both people and enterprises, some 
time was necessary to economise on real balances (Horder, 1997: 37). Some 
commentators have also pointed out how, considering the Russian inflationary 
climate, the adjustment of real balances turned out to be extraordinary slow
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Purpose of section 2.4 and of the remainder of this essay is to combine the ideas 
presented in section 2.2 and section 2.3 in a unique theoretical framework. In general, 
the time inconsistency problem has been analysed, either in the context of a closed 
economy, or of a Mundell-Fleming open economy. We propose applying a 
methodology which allows us to study the time inconsistency analysis in the context 
of an open economy a-la-Dombusch, characterised by a forward looking variable, as 
the exchange rate, and a sluggish variable as real balances. We believe that this more 
complex and interesting dynamic framework allows us to enhance our economic 
understanding of macroeconomicallv unstable economies.
The insight of our modelling exercise proves to be valuable, and can be broadly 
compared to the Russia's recent experience in the early 90’s. The analysis suggests 
that the optimal time inconsistent solution adopted by a government in great financial 
difficulties is to implement an expansionary monetary policy whilst promising a 
future rigorous monetary policy.
This was probably the case for Russia in the early 90’s, as is documented in Russian 
F.conomie Trends. Due to the great difficulties in financing the budget deficit, the 
growth rate of the money supply remained out of control; but, nonetheless, the 
government kept on promising that public expenditure and the growth rate of money 
would soon be reduced. For example, in 1993 the newly appointed minister of finance 
and deputy prime minister. Boris Fedorov, managed to persuade Viktor Gerashchenko 
to set credit targets, which pledged a progressive decline in the growth rate of the 
money supply While to some extent this policy was successful, unsurprisingly, these 
credit targets proved to be over-optimistic (see Skidelsky, 1996: 4, Aslund, 1995: 7, 
Russian Economic Trends, 1993 2.3).
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If the promise of tight future monetary policies is credible, three objectives are 
contemporaneously achieved: firstly seigniorage remains high, because of the 
expansionary nature of monetary policy; secondly, the exchange rate remains stable 
for financial markets anticipate tight monetary policies; thirdly, for the same reason, 
economic agents realise that there is a reduced necessity to economise on real 
balances.
Nevertheless, under the more likely hypothesis that the government announcement is 
not credible, financial markets are able to foresee that the government is not going to 
choose a rigorous monetary policy.
With rational financial markets, the exchange rate is able to anticipate the real 
monetary policies that the government will implement and hence remain extremely 
weak. The analysis can therefore explain why a country in great financial difficulties, 
with a non credible government, is generally characterised by a weak real exchange 
rate.
To attain these results we have applied some interesting mathematical techniques. 
While it is extremely simple to calculate the time inconsistent and the time consistent 
solutions in the traditional closed economic set up, it is certainly more complex in a 
dynamic framework a-la-Dornbusch. The purpose of the remainder of this essay is to 
derive both the time inconsistent and time consistent solution under this economic set 
up Rather surprisingly, the time consistent solution - which is empirically the most 
relevant - turns out to be extremely simple Later in chapter 3, Kxchange Rale 
I hitler valuation and Institutional Reform, we will discuss to what extent these results 
correctly describe the Russian economic experience. Above all, in chapter 3 we will 
concentrate on the policy message of this analysis: it turns out, in fact, that according 
to our model, the Russian process of economic adjustment would have been very
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different - and more favourable - if there had been, instead of Viktor Gerashchenko, a 
more conservative central banker.
From a technical point of view, the existence of a price dynamics and an exchange 
rate dynamics requires that the solution paths of the macroeconomic variables depend 
on a system of differential equations. Hence, the minimisation of the government loss 
function becomes a problem of optimal control. A further complication arises from 
the assumption that there exists a different speed of adjustment between the exchange 
rate and the price level.
As we will later discuss, the solution derived with the standard optimal control is the 
time inconsistent solution (see section 2.5). Consequently it is not possible to apply 
standard control theory to find the time consistent solution Cohen and Michel (1988) 
have nevertheless shown how to proceed under these circumstances: to obtain 
solutions which satisfy the time consistency constraint, in a dynamic framework with 
forward looking variables, it is sufficient modify slightly standard control theory (see 
section 2.6)
Once derived, both the time inconsistent and the time consistent solutions, we will 
then be able to calculate the loss level associated with each. Such a procedure allows 
us to verify the standard result that it would be desirable, from a theoretical point of 
view, to attain for the time inconsistent solution. In practice, however, the best 
available strategy is to devise a monetary arrangement which allows us to reach a 
suitable approximation to the time inconsistent solution.
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.2 The Barro Model: Hyperinflation as Lack of Credibility
In the first essay of this thesis we suggested how the classic interpretation of 
hyperinflation critically relies on the assumption that monetary authorities 
deliberately increase seigniorage to take advantage of money demand slow response. 
According to this economic theory, the government is always capable of money 
financing the deficit: granted that this pushes up inflation, and, if currency 
substitution is assumed, the stock of foreign exchange held by the private sector as 
well (see section 1.5). We discussed how, implicitly, Cagan's approach either 
postulates that economic agents are not rational or, alternatively, that economic 
agents are subject to a process of partial adjustment of money demand
In this present section, just as in Barro (1983), we focus upon an alternative 
interpretation of hyperinflation Economic agents are supposed to be rational and 
hence be able to forecast the real intentions of the government According to this 
approach, hyperinflation episodes are best explained by the lack of credibility of the 
government.
The economic insight of his research is the following: the government has an 
incentive to announce a low inflation rate to persuade economic agents to expand 
their money demand Money demand is, in fact, the tax base of seigniorage.
Yet. the government does not have the incentive to keep faith with its commitment as 
it would thereafter choose an expansionary monetary policy to secure higher 
seigniorage.
In analogy to the traditional time inconsistency analysis, however, economic agents 
are assumed to be able to foresee the real intentions of the government So their
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response is to reduce immediately their money demand to lower the forthcoming 
economic loss'.
For the present purposes let us now introduce a simplified analysis of this model. 
Assume a closed economy in which money demand is a negative function of the 
interest rate:
2.1) m -  p  = -Ai
and the real interest rate is constant:
2.2) ir = i - x '  
and equal to zero
Following Barro's analysis, let us also assume that expected intlation is a constant:
The latter equation greatly simplifies the model from a technical point of view while 
preserving its main economic insights. As a direct consequence, the intlation rate and 
the growth rate of money are equal:
2.4) n  = q
Suppose also that the government minimises the following loss function, which
1 Namely, the intlation tax
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depends positively on inflation, r  and negatively on seigniorage, Z
2.5) L = ae* -  bZ
where a and h are the two weights respectively associated to inflation and 
seigniorage.
Clearly it is possible to express the loss function in terms of inflation and expected 
inflation as follows:
2.6) L=ae* -bne-**’
Consider now that the government chooses the inflation rate with the objective to 
minimise its loss:
.7)
J r
and we therefore derive the government reaction function
2 .8 ) K = log) —J -  Àr "
At this stage of the analysis we are in a position to examine all the various alternative 
solutions. Suppose, for example, that the government announces a zero growth rate of 
money with the objective to encourage a greater money demand Suppose, in 
addition, that economic agents consider this commitment as reliable:
2.9) r - = 0
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If the government keeps faith with its announcement, seigniorage remains at zero; 
w hereas if the government chooses a positive inflation rate, seigniorage is conversely 
positive. As a result, there is a definite incentive for the government to cheat and to 
set the following inflation rate:
2. 10)
which would bring about a seigniorage equal to
2.11) 7J = lo g f - l
Since in this scenario economic agents make a mistake, we can label this as the 
fooling solution^
In analogy to the traditional time inconsistency literature, it seems more likely that 
economic agents foresee the government desire to tax liquidity If, this time, expected 
inflation is equal to the actual outcome:
2.12) k '’ = k
money holdings would be reduced and so would be the tax base available to the 
government
It is important to note that the rationality of economic agents changes the intentions of
" To be precise this is not exactly the fooling solution The optimal solution to the government would be 
to promise an intlation rate equal to minus infinity while choosing an inflation rate equal to plus infinity
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the government. To verify this, let us calculate the time consistent inflation rate:
2.13)
1 + T
and the associated level of seigniorage
Considering the reduction of the tax base, we And that the government prefers to 
choose a smaller inflation rate, since it is less beneficial to adopt a high inflation 
policy:
2.15) n u < rt'
The reduction of the inflation rate is of course good news, however, the consequent 
loss in seigniorage must be taken into account as well
2.16) Z" < Z f
Overall, economic agents rationality has a negative impact on the economic system as 
the time consistent loss level increases:
2.17) / , " > / /
' Both the growth rate of money and money demand are smaller
77
From the economic point of view, the most interesting aspect of the Barro model is 
that it explains why the inflation rate might be very high in a country which has 
severe financial difficulties, as Russia certainly had. If the weight associated to 
seigniorage in the loss function. A, is a large number, the time consistent inflation 
rate is high (see equation 2.13). The reason is that the government is ready to accept a 
high inflation rate to earn a good level of seigniorage. For example. Russian monetary 
authorities seemed to be. for long time, much more concerned about large enterprises 
closing down rather than of high inflation (see section 1.22). Time consistent 
economic agents were therefore probably able to correctly anticipate that the credit 
flow to enterprises was not soon going to be halted.
Barro's analysis finally suggests that the solution to the policy credibility problem is 
to delegate the control of monetary policy to an independent and conservative central 
banker, since its anti-inflationary stance brings about a rise in money demand The 
expansion in money demand is. in fact, crucial to secure seigniorage at a low inflation 
rate.
We maintain that the model successfully describes the effects of a non credible 
government, and why there is a case for appointing a conservative central banker The 
government intention to finance the deficit by printing money is the root of the time 
consistency problem Plainly, however, Barro's model is not perfectly suitable to 
describe the Russian economy: firstly, because it supposes a closed economy while 
exchange rate fluctuations in those circumstances would have had a relevant role; 
secondly because it does not seem to us a good description of the Russian economy to 
assume that real balances could be quickly adjusted. Consider, moreover, how the 
model just described is not properly dynamic since expectations are constrained to be 
constant.
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The purpose of the remainder of this essay is to propose a similar study in a dynamic 
open economy framework. We will apply a methodology which allows us to extend 
the time inconsistency literature in the context of an open economy a-la-Dombusch. 
We believe that the main conclusions to be drawn on the real exchange rate and 
liquidity shed some light on Russia's economic experience in the early 90’s. 
However, to begin with, we need to review the exchange rate overshooting literature.
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2.3 The Dornbusch Literature
This section reviews the open economy macroeconomic literature a-la-Dornbusch 
which is going to be, subsequently, the dynamic framework of our analysis.
It is well known how the Dombusch model has succeeded in extending the IS LM 
analysis to the case where prices are not fixed. However, the most relevant aspect of 
such work has been to emphasise the significance of the different speed of adjustment 
between the financial and the goods market.
Consider, to begin with, how the sluggishness of the price level implies that monetary 
policy has a real effect on the interest rate. Yet. if perfect capital mobility and risk 
neutrality are assumed, the rate of return on domestic and foreign bonds should be 
equal. Thus the distinctive feature of the Dornbusch model is that the exchange rate 
immediately adjusts to avoid a spread between the rate of return of domestic and 
foreign bonds
Suppose, for example, that the government decides to adopt an expansionary 
monetary policy. The domestic currency would become unattractive for two different 
reasons: on one hand the interest rate paid on domestic bonds would fall, on the other 
hand an expansionary monetary policy would tend to weaken the exchange rate
To encourage domestic and foreign investors to hold domestic bonds, the exchange 
rate, therefore, must devalue at once, up to the point that it becomes reasonable to 
expect a future appreciation of the exchange rate. Hence, the model predicts that a 
change in monetary policy leads to the overshooting of the exchange rate.
80
The traditional Dombusch model (1976) examines what the impact effect is of a 
change in the level of money supply on the exchange late. However, it is not really 
suitable to examine changes in the rate of growth of money supply4. For this reason 
we review the Buiter and Miller (1981) analysis which extends the Dornbusch model 
to the case where the growth rate of money is positive.
Similarly to the Dombusch model, it is a small open economy model which assumes 
floating exchange rates, perfect capital mobility, sticky prices a-la-Dombusch. 
rational financial investors and risk neutral speculators. As shortly will become clear, 
the Buiter and Miller model is able to preserve and extend the original economic 
insight of the Dombusch model.
The demand side of the model has the typical IS l.M structure, the supply side is 
given by a Phillips curve relationship while the open economy is driven by the 
arbitrage equation'
We present here a slightly simplified version of the Buiter Miller model, characterised 
by the following log-linear equations:
2.18) m -  p  -  -A i + fjÿ  (LM curve)
2.19) v = - / ( / -  /r) + er(.v -  p+  /j") (IS curve)
2.20) n  = </>(y  -  ÿ ) + 1) (Phillips curve)
2.21) — = / - / "  (Arbitraire equation)
Ji
4 A further implicit simplification of the model is to assume that trade unions expected inflation to be 
equal to zero Emphasis is given to the rationality of financial markets 
One feature, which distinguishes this model from Cagans model, is that the real interest rate is not 
constant but a function of the monetary policy adopted
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List of Symbols
i n  logarithm o f  the nominal money stock 
p  logarithm o f  the price level
p "  logarithm o f  the foreign price level 
v logarithm o f  domestic income
v logarithm o f  permanent income
p  rate o f  growth o f  money and core inflation 
i  dom estic interest rate
/ * foreign interest rate
v logarithm o f  the exchange rate
where all parameters are positive.
Equation 2.18) is derived by assuming equilibrium in the money market. Real money 
demand negatively depends on the opportunity cost of holding money, i and 
positively on permanent income. y '\
Output is determined by demand which in turn is supposed to be a negative function 
of the instantaneous real interest rate, / - / r ,  and a positive lunction ot 
competitiveness, x - p + p " (equation 2.19).
A Phillips curve type of mechanism generates inflation: inflation is. in tact, assumed 
to be positively related to the gap between real output and permanent income, 
augmented by core inflation, which can be interpreted as the trade union expected 
inflation (equation 2.20) For the present purposes we maintain the Buiter and Miller
" ll is simple to extend the model so as to allow money demand to depend on flexible output, rather than 
on permanent income
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restrictive hypothesis that core inflation has only a backward component: hence we 
suppose that it is equal to the rate of growth of money supply
The last equation of the model is the uncovered interest rate parity, whereby the 
existence of risk neutral speculators with perfect foresight ensures that domestic and 
foreign assets have the same rate of return (equation 2.21). Of course, this requires 
that any exchange rate depreciation of the domestic currency must be matched by a 
positive interest rate differential.
As permanent income, foreign prices and the foreign interest rate are all constants, we 
can set them equal to zero.
v -  p w = / ” =0
By defining / as real money balances,
2.22) l = m - p , 
and t as competitiveness,
2.23) c = s - p ,
we can reduce the model into a linear system of differential equations as below:
It Is possible to define core inflation in various different ways For instance, in their original article 
Buiter and Miller (1981 156-159) argue that generally a delay occurs before a change in the rate of 
growth of money supply affects expected inflation Moreover, they suggest how to alter the 
specification of the core to capture this delay Conversely, it is also possible to postulate that core 
inflation not only has a backward looking but also a forward looking component We maintain that the 
original article by Buiter and Miller closely matches the Dornbusch analysis in the sense that the focal 
point is the forward looking nature o f  financial markets
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d l _ -<j>yÀ ' /  -  fia i: -  <j>yq 
d i~  Q
2 .25)
de _  -À ~ 'l -  (j>ac -  q 
~dt~  Q
where Q is defined as:
2 .2 6 ) Q  = \ -  y</).
Inflation can therefore be expressed in terms of l ,c ,q , as here below:
28)
7  +  0erc +  q 
Q
The model is characterised by one forward looking variable c , one predetermined 
variable / and a control variable q Moreover the growth rate of money, q , is 
exogenous while the assumption of saddle point stability is sufficient to ensure the 
existence of a unique stable solution*
The mam economic insight of the Dornbuseh model still holds Suppose, for example, 
that the government decides for an expansionary monetary policy (see Fig. 2.1).
In the very short run, real balances are fixed while the exchange rate jumps on the 
new stable manifold of the system, labelled on Fig 2 I as TT The impact effect of a 
monetary expansion is hence a jump of the economy from point A to B. Thereafter, a 
slow process of convergence along the stable manifold brings the economy to its new 
steady state, D.
'  The implied restriction to the parameters is Q  > 0
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F ig .  2 .1  T h e  C o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  a n  E x p a n s io n a r y  M o n e ta r y  P o lic y
T
0
As expected, the economic insight of the model is in line with the Dombusch 
analysis. The model suggests that a rise in the growth rate of money brings about a 
temporary real exchange rate depreciation. Moreover, economic agents progressively 
manage to economise on real balances. Rather surprisingly the above presented figure 
is going to be relevant again later on when we will postulate time consistent agents 
and an endogenous growth rate of money (section 2.6) As will become clear at that 
time, this feature allows us to simplify and improve the economic understanding of 
our model '
In /■jechanf’e Rale IIndervalualion an ti Inuilu lional Reform  we will be able tu verily how. from an 
empirical point o f view, this ligure seems to be a fairly accurate description of the Russian transition 
process
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2.4 The Model
Our objective in this essay is to apply the existing techniques to extend the time 
inconsistency analysis in the context of a dynamic open economy a-la-Dombusch. As 
already mentioned, we believe that this more complex and interesting dvnamic 
framework allows to enhance our understanding of the macroeconomic environment 
of unstable economies.
Assume that the government controls the growth rate of money supply, q ,'° with the 
intent to minimise the following quadratic discounted stream of costs:
where 7t stands for inflation, q is the rate of growth of money supply, q is the target 
rate of growth of money supply and c is the discount rate
To begin with, as in the standard time consistency literature, a high inflation rate is 
assumed to be harmful hence the weight a in the loss function is supposed to be 
positive.
In an economic setting similar to Russia, the other top priority is to have a sufficiently 
expansionary monetary policy to help finance the deficit and issue subsidised credits: 
hence we assume that the government chooses a positive target growth rate of money 
/; > 0 to ensure the collection of seigniorage" u . *1
In the present analysis we leave aside the difficulty o f measuring and controlling money supply 
aggregates
11 If we included seigniorage in the loss function, the model would become non-linear Indeed, one 
possible extension to the present analysis may be to investigate the implications o f such a non-linearity 
But this would require to study the applicability of the Cohen and Michel technique to non-linear
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Therefore our analysis extends the Buiter and Miller model to the case where the 
growth rate of money is no longer exogenous but is rather endogenously determined 
as the solution to the above minimisation problem.
While it is extremely simple to calculate the time inconsistent and the time consistent 
solutions in the traditional closed economic set up, this is certainly more complex in a 
dynamic framework a-la-Dombusch
The classic Hamiltonian analysis allows one to determine the optimal path for the 
control variable (in our case the growth rate of money supply, rj) at time / = 0 
However, it has been shown by various authors (see for example, Kydland and 
Prescott (1977), Lucas and Sargent (1981), Calvo (1978a), Driffill (1982)) that the 
solution derived by standard control theory is the time inconsistent solution In fact, it 
is possible to verify that in general the solution which is optimal at the beginning, is 
no longer so at a later stage: hence the government does not have the incentive to 
implement the original plan If the solution does not remain optimal over time, it is 
said to violate Bellman's principle of optimality
The essay proceeds as follows. First the time inconsistent solution is derived in 
section 2.5. Second, it is necessary to find alternative ways to calculate time 
consistent solutions (i.e. solutions which satisfy the principle of optimality of 12
systems of differential equations In addition, it is important to note that liquidity is not subject to jumps 
in the present context On the basis o f this, if the government seeks to reach a desired target for 
seigniorage, Z , it just needs to implement a sufficiently expansionary monetary policy, rj A constant 
target for seigniorage would require a target growth rate of money which has to be function of time 
Here, for sake of simplicity, we content ourselves to assume a constant target growth rate of money
12 With sluggish liquidity, at each moment in time the greater rj, the greater seigniorage Z For this 
reason, the growth rate of money could be thought as a proxy for seigniorage To avoid a target for
1 *
seigniorage, the following alternative loss iiinction may be used L  = — J  —2 ^ d t  The 
main economic insights of Ihe model would remain, by and large, ihe same
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Bellman). Our analysis refers to the theoretical articles by Cohen and Michel (1988), 
Miller and Salmon (1984) and Currie and Levine (1986), where it is shown how 
standard control theory should be modified to obtain time consistent solutions in a 
dynamic framework with forward looking variables. One early application of the time 
inconsistency problem in a similar dynamic environment can be found in Miller 
(1985), further developed in Miller and Salmon (1990)'’ .
1 ’ Their analysis is different from ours for two reasons The first is that in their loss function, as in the 
traditional time consistency literature, includes intlation and unemployment while here, as the analysis 
refers to transition or underdeveloped countries, the loss tunction includes intlation and the growth rate 
o f money In our model, instead of having the classic trade-off between intlation and unemployment, we 
have the more obvious trade-off between intlation and monetary growth The second reason is that the 
Miller and Salmon model does not include a specification for money demand while we adhere to a more 
standard open economy model This turns out to be crucially important, as our model has the interesting 
feature that the steady state for monetary growth and intlation is not invariant (as in Miller and Salmon), 
but it is crucially affected by the type of solution considered The steady state itself, and not just the 
dynamic path, depends on whether the solution is time inconsistent or time consistent, and changes with 
the appointment of a central banker or with the choice o fa  feedback solution
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2.5 Time Inconsistent Solutions
The aim of this section is to calculate the time inconsistent solutions for the growth 
rate of money and inflation. To this end, we derive the standard solution to the 
optimal control problem by setting up the appropriate Hamiltonian to our 
minimisation problem:
where /;, and /;, are the shadow prices associated to the predetermined variable / 
and the forward looking variable c. The first order conditions are given bv the 
following equations:
2.30)
-</>yA ' /  -  tfioi -  </>yr¡ -A  ' / -  <¡><yc -  r¡
n  q
2.31) " , =  0
2.32) H,
Jh,
2.33)
Jt
By defining the current value shadow prices as
2.34)
2.35)
it is possible to derive the optimal growth rate of money:
and to express the system of equations in the fo llow ing standard linear matrix form
.37)
aL 
dt 
dq,
dt
dq:
dt
dc
L dt J
u + Çl-
!
a +
where
38)
A, =
-(u + - ( t / Y
~“( W ' )  (u + i ï ) 0 y À +(tv + Q - ) ç  ( u + n ) / l  1 
- u ip -a y k '  (</ + Q : )^ <t + Q ^ytx (<r + i i : )s- +
—(i/ + £2)>l 1 ~tf>y —1
-(a  + Q)^<x 
-atj> <r/À~' 
-a(4>cry 
-0o ii
and
2.39) h, = -lu/ryÀ  1 q  
- atpcrr) 
-Clr,
I he steady state solutions are given by:
2.40)
/ *
For the reason that prices are sluggish but not fixed, the steady state real exchange 
rate returns to equilibrium - as in the standard Buiter and Miller model -
2.41) t* = 0
The unique solutions for / , < / , are determined by applying the saddle path 
restriction to the above system If we define the stable eigenvalues as />, and p , and 
the stable eigenvectors as:
( n '  1 'l
X 1 9 = •9,X:
<Xv
the solutions are then equal to:
2.43) I = + N2eP:‘ +1*
2.44) Vi = X , ^ , ^ '  + 9 ,* /^ * ' +</, *
2.45) V: =  + 9 2N2er '' +  q 2 *
2.46 ) c = z, NiL’n,‘ + 9 , N2e‘”' +c*
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where it is possible to determine the two constants, /V, and N2 by taking into 
account the two following constraints. The first is the initial condition for real 
balances.
2.47) /(») = /„
and the second is the optimality condition,
2.48) <h(0) = 0
which states that the shadow cost of the real exchange rate has to be zero at time
l = 0 14.
Given equations 2.36) and 2.28), we derive the time inconsistent paths for both the 
growth rate of money and inflation: hence it becomes possible to calculate the 
associated loss by solving integral 2.29). Moreover, it is also possible to prove that 
both paths in the steady state converge to the following value1' :
To get a deeper understanding of our analysis let us now examine a numerical 
example by assigning some specific values to the parameters of the model and, 
moreover, by choosing an initial condition for real balances (Simulation A). For the 
parameters which are in common with the Buiter Miller model let us precisely choose
14 See Cohen and Michel (1988 267) and Miller and Salmon (1084 73)
|s Equation 2.49) holds in the standard Buiter Miller model (1981) as well. Both the time inconsistent 
inflation rate and the time inconsistent growth rate of money converge to minus the steady state value of 
real balances divided by the semi-elasticity o f money demand, A ., (i.e the slope of the money demand 
equation)
2.49) /*7T= rj= — r
/ t
*the same values which the authors themselves suggested to be plausible (1981: 171). 
As will become clear later on, the crucial parameter value is the interest sensitivity of 
money demand, A , here assumed to be equal to two (A = 2). In the Phillips curve a 
one percent increase in income above permanent income is supposed to cause a half
elasticity of demand, with respect to the exchange rate, and the semi-elasticity of
We also set a target annual growth rate of money supply equal to two (7j = 2), a five 
percent annual discount rate (^=0.05), a weight for inflation in the loss function 
equal to two (a = 2) and the initial value for real balances equal to zero (/„ = 0)
Thus we have all the information required to derive the time inconsistent solutions for 
inflation, monetary growth and the exchange rate. Henceforth, we can calculate the 
associated loss:
The shape of the optimal time inconsistent path is crucially affected by the initial 
value of real balances As in this specific case we have chosen - in view of the large 
monetary overhang in Russia - a relatively "high" initial value for real balances 
(/„ = 0), in the process of adjustment, real balances must fall to the steady state value 
(/* = -1.24) this in turn requires having a temporary positive gap between inflation 
and monetary growth
demand, with respect to the real interest rate, are also set equal to a half | er = y = —
2.50) /." = 28.3568
2.51) c/l
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Our insight is confirmed by plotting the optimal time inconsistent paths for monetary 
growth and inflation as a function of time (see Fig. 2.2):
F ig . 2.2 Tim e Inconsisten t P a th s  for M onetary  G row th and  Inflation
At time / = 0 the optimal growth rate for money supply is approximately equal to 
0.22, while the inflation rate is higher and equal to 0.84 The discrepancy between 
the two paths disappears as they progressively convergence to the stead\ state 
(rt = rj = 0.619666)
One reason why the inflation rate is higher than the rate of monetary expansion is that 
the real exchange rate, c , is temporary undervalued. To be precise, in our example 
the real exchange rate overshoots to I 66 before falling back to its equilibrium value,
0 (Fig. 2.3).
The weakness in the real exchange rate has an inflationary impact, because it 
stimulates demand via an improvement in the current account"'
1 Moreover, since Ihe real exchange rale appreciates during the process o f  adjustment, the real interest
c/c
rate is negative, —  = I  — H  <  0 and, naturallv, this has also an inllationarv impact, because demand is 
dt
stimulated via an increase in investment
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F ig .  2 .3  Time Inconsistent P a th  for the Real Exchange Rate
t
As previously discussed, the optimal paths drawn in Fig 2.2-2.3 do not satisfy the 
principle of optimality: if Financial markets are rational these paths do not have any 
empirical relevance.
There is a simple way to verify that the initially planned policy is lime inconsistent. 
Let us suppose, for instance, that the government actually implements the planned 
monetary policy from time 1 = 0  to t = 2 and only then realises that it is possible to 
reduce the loss by choosing a new path for the growth rate of money
Plotting the new' and the 'old' path from time / = 2 onwards (Fig. 2.4), if we had 
time consistency, the two paths would be identical. Instead, the new path for 
monetary growth (RR) is always above the old path (7.7.)
Hence, we can verify that our initial economic insight was correct While at time 
i 0 the optimal policy for the government is to announce a conservative monetary 
policy for fear of the inflationary impact of the exchange rate, at time / = 2 the 
government has the incentive to expand the growth rate of money more than it had 
previously announced
d5
F ig . 2 .4  Violation of Belman’s Principle of Optimality
As this incentive does not only exist only when 1 = 2 but in any moment in time, 
financial markets learn how the government behaves and hence revise their 
expectations accordingly17. I
I he above depicted path RR puts in evidence why the government is tempted to cheat It corresponds 
to the fooling solution in a dynamic set up
2.6 Time Consistent Solutions
The objective of this section is to derive and plot the time consistent solutions to our 
optimisation problem. We assume that financial markets agents are rational and 
hence, when they form expectations of future monetary policy, they anticipate that the 
government may not have the incentive to follow the monetary policy previously 
announced at t = 0. We have shown with the example of Simulation A that financial 
markets would make a mistake if they were to expect the 'conservative' monetarv 
policy announced by the authorities (and plotted in Fig. 2.2). The announcement of a 
tight future monetary policy, in fact, serves the purpose of defending the exchange 
rate to reduce the inflationary pressures1*, but the government does not ha\e the 
incentive to adhere to such a plan. Thus economic agents need to revise their 
expectations of future monetary policy. They are not fooled' only if they anticipate 
the true monetary policies chosen by the government and if the latter remain optimal 
at any moment in time As in the time-inconsistent analysis, the solution should also 
be stable and thus converge to the steady state
To derive the solution for the control variable which satisfies the properties of time- 
invariancy and stability we apply the method proposed by Cohen and Michel. The 
main result of their paper is that given a linear quadratic loss function, the tune 
consistent solution for the forward looking variable is a predetermined linear function 
of the state variables with constant parameters Since the forward looking variable is 
predetermined, its value is no longer influenced by any ‘false promise that the 
government might make. As suggested by Miller. Salmon and Sutherland (1991 144). 
the parameters could be thought as measuring private expectations
lxBv announcing a future (relatively) conservative monetary policy the overshooting of the exchange 
rate is smaller, reducing therefore its inflationary impact
Cohen and Michel emphasised how once the forward looking variable is assumed to 
be a predetermined linear function of the state variable with unknown parameters, the 
optimal time consistent solutions can be calculated with standard control theorv The 
unknown parameters are determined only subsequently to ensure both the fulfillment 
of the predetermined expectations and the stability of the system
Applying the technique to our problem we assume that the real exchange rate is a 
linear function of the state variable / ,  where the unknown parameters are labelled as 
a  and v :
2.52) c = a+Ki
The real exchange rate therefore cannot be controlled bv the government and in all 
respects 2.52) is a new constraint added to the loss minimisation process. Given 2.52). 
the only remaining state variable which the government effectively influences is real 
balances. /
The appropriate Hamiltonian is. hence, now equal to:
where h is the costate variable I expanding the Hamiltonian by substituting equation 
2.28) and equation 2 24), we derive the following expression:
2.54)
4X
As in standard control theory, the first order conditions are determined by imposing 
the following conditions:
2.55) Hn = 0
2.56) H,=
dh_
Ji
By defining the current value multiplier as:
2.57) i/ = he4'
the two first order conditions are equal to
From 2.58) the optimal growth rate of money can he expressed as
2.60) n = -ti<f>y/. '/ -  uiJxtl + ip'AShf + Q : /; ct + L Ÿ
Given equations 2.21 ), 2.25), 2.58) and 2.50) the system is reduced in matrix form to:
00
2.61)
where
2.62)
A.
and h, as:
2.63)
I he stead)
2.64)
'  dl_ 
d t
dii
di
dc
Hi
I
cl + ii--.4 , + a + Q '
is defined as:
a0y/.
= ; -acfr//. (<jr//. + ¡¡r/s. ) 
-cl/. -ÌÌÀ
~(&)
(a + n)(<fryÂ + + f i ; )é
-tpy
-<t>rh
h. = \ -</(</>yA +</>ct\-)ii/
- n  n
state solutions are
t *  =  0
(a+n)/.
<t>y
-a (per - Cltpcr 
-afatyyX 1 + (pcK-) 
-(pnQ.
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where 'H is defined as:
2.65) T = ¿/.Cl + y<j> + K/.<fxj
As in the time-inconsistent case, the steady state real exchange rate converges to zero. 
Furthermore, steady state real balances are negative and depend on the weight <; in 
the loss function1 ’
The assumption of stability of the system and self-fulfillment of private expectations 
are necessary to determine the unknown coefficients. Since the real exchange rate. c. 
and the shadow price. </ , are forward looking variables, while real balances, / .  is 
sluggish, to have saddle stability the system should have one negative eigenvalue Bv
defining v, <0 as the stable eigenvalue of the system and i ip as the stable
K
eigenvector, the solutions arc equal to
2.66) / = (/„ - t* )c" +1*
2.67) </ = <p(l„ - l * ) c '  ' + q *
2.68) c = *■(/„ -  / * y  '
and the true' relationship between competitiveness and real balances is
2.69) c = v ( / - / * )
1 ( Given the Buiter and Miller structure of the model, it seems intuitive that the higher the concern for 
inflation, the greater steady state real balances need to be
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Given rational time consistent expectations, the predetermined parameters can be 
computed by assuming that financial markets correctly anticipate this relationship. 
Clearly, from equation 2.52) and 2.69) the coefficient a  must be equal to
2.70) a  = -Ki*
Less straightforward is how to determine the other predetermined coefficient, v 
Nevertheless, to have convergence, the following condition must be satisfied.
2.71)
T V
-L <p = vv<p
K' K\
where v appears both in the square matrix A: and in the stable eigenvector. \<p\.
v
With the system of equations 2.71) it is possible to find the signs of the following 
parameters.
A" >  0  
tp > 0
showing that the stable manifold has a positive slope
It is also possible to evaluate the precise value of the negative eigenvalue, v, and 
hence of the parameters k and <p with the procedure that we now describe. Since 
2.71) is a three equations linear system with three unknowns, k , <p and v ,, by
I »2
substituting k- and <p the value of the stable eigenvalue, v( , can be found as the 
solution to a fourth degree equation in v ,. It turns out that there is a unique negative 
solution for vt , while there are three positive solutions which are not acceptable
The solutions for the time consistent inflation rate and for the time consistent growth 
rate of money are equal to,
 ^ ^  + ih/io-K- + </>ytp\lt, -  / *)e'' -  + Q; )/. 1
a + n :
 ^  ^ (~at/>y/ . -  lu)kjk + L'hfrytpll,, -  / *)e’ ' -  (it + Q:)/. 1
n a + Q:
and can be plotted In the steady state inflation and monetary growth are equal, and 
equation 2.40) still holds.
*  = n = -
/*
even if the steads state value for real balances. / * . is now endogenously determined
Although the analysis so far carried out has been, to a large extent, technical the 
derived time consistent solution is fairly simple For example, our simulation analysis 
suggests that the time consistent stable manifold looks as the following figure (see 
Fig. 2.5).
103
F ig . 2.5 T he Im pact and  Long-Run Effect of a Time C onsis ten t 
M onetary  Policy
It is important in first place to point out that the solution is general and would 
therefore have been very similar if different parameters had been chosen. But what 
seems particularly interesting to us is the perfect analogy between Fig 2.5 and the 
phase diagram characterising the Buiter and Miller model (Fig. 2.1), despite the 
following different features:
a) there is a government which needs to print money to finance the deficit;
b) monetary policy is endogenously devised to achieve this purpose;
c) financial markets anticipate the future monetary policies;
At first sight that the time consistency constraint has not modified the Buiter and 
Miller key figure may come as a surprise. To shed some light on this, it is sufficient to 
see how the logic of the overshooting literature still applies here. Financial markets 
do not form expectations by reiving on promises which the government might make 
but rather by foreseeing what the government is prepared to do With rational 
expectations, the future expansionary monetary policies are anticipated As a 
consequence, a large sudden depreciation of the exchange rate is necessary to sustain 
the initial level of money demand
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If the starting point is a monetary overhang, thereafter liquidity follows a downward 
process of convergence to its new steady state. One of the aims in the next essay will 
be examining whether Fig. 2.5 is broadly supported by the available Russian data
Further simulation analysis also shows how the size of the initial real exchange rate 
jump is a negative function of the weight, a. Therefore the model predicts that the 
greater the government's need to finance the deficit and to subsidise enterprises debts 
by money financing, the greater the real exchange rate jump On the basis of this 
argument, the present analysis can broadly justify the scale of Russia's recent 
experience of undervaluation.
Concluding this discussion, let us refer to the time consistency literature which savs 
that if it were possible to attain the time inconsistent solution, overall loss would be 
smaller As a cross check, it is possible to verify that, in our simulation, loss is higher 
with time consistent expectations (/." =28.3931) than with time inconsistent
expectations (/." = 28.3568) Even in this framework, rationality' leads to a worse
performance of the economy. Some possible solutions to the time consistency 
problem, are discussed in the forthcoming essay
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2.7 Final Remarks
In this chapter we have applied the Cohen and Michel procedure to study the time 
inconsistency problem in a dynamic open economy a-la-Dombusch. A special loss 
function was used for the present purposes, but the methodology here developed is 
general and may be applied to address other economic issues. To this end. it is 
sufficient to modify the loss function while maintaining the basic structure of the 
Buiter and Miller model.
Leaving aside the technical aspects, what we believe to be the most interesting 
outcome o f this essay is that the Buiter and Miller key figure remains valid, despite 
the different features of the model analysed here On this occasion the real exchange 
rate initial response depends on the government’s credibility with regards to future 
monetary policies The more the government cares about an expansionary monetary 
policy, the greater the real exchange rate jump
For a financially weak country, as Russia certainly is. the message is simple but 
important a large experience of undervaluation may be justified by a lack of 
confidence in the government. Lstablishing credibility is therefore crucial to hinder a 
collapse of the currency
A key objective of the forthcoming chapter. I'.xcluin^e Rate I Hdcrval nation mid 
Institutional Reform, is to examine whether a different monetary arrangement helps to 
overcome the policy credibility problem Using the same analytical framework, we 
show the consequences, for example, of appointing a central banker, who is less keen 
on expansionary monetary policies than the government. The basic insight is that the 
exchange rate remains stronger because tlnancial markets anticipate future 
conservative monetary policies Formal analysis suggests that it is possible to improve
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on the time eonsistent solution bv reaching a suitable approximation to the time 
inconsistent solution.
In the same chapter vve also propose a natural extension of the model by letting 
currency substitution, between domestic and foreign assets, be the alternative 
assumption to perfect mobility of financial capital. As pointed out earlier, the 
hypothesis of currency substitution seems to be more appropriate for countries at the 
early stages of economic transition.
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Chapter 3
E xchange R ate U n d e rv a lu a tio n  an d  In s titu t io n a l
R eform
3.1 Introduction
The present essay applies the research that we developed so far to the Russian 
undervaluation experience. Our first aim is to examine whether the analvsis is a good 
description of the empirical data at our disposal; it is also our objective to investigate 
whether there are any policy suggestions brought out from this study
The main leature of the model developed in Time ( 'onsistencv m an < >pcn l.conomv, 
a-la-lhtrnhusch is that the financial markets understand the real intentions of policy 
makers regarding future monetary policies. While velocity of money is supposed to 
be a sluggish variable, the real exchange rate is conversely supposed to be forward 
looking If the government lacks credibility, the exchange rate response is hence to 
devalue at once The greater the government's need to finance the deficit by printing 
money, the greater the real exchange rate jump Therefore the analysis seems to
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account for the outstanding scale of the rouble undervaluation, considering the 
precariousness of the Russian financial standing in the early 90's. A further 
peculiarity of the model is that, over time, economic agents learn to economise on 
real balances.
In short, the model suggests that the adjustment process should proceed along a path 
which closely resembles the stable manifold depicted in Fig. 2.5. To find out whether 
there is any empirical evidence for this relationship in section 3.2 we cross plot 
monthly data of the real exchange rate and of real balances. Once we establish that 
the study is - at least to some extent - supported by the available data, we attempt to 
carry our study a step forward: our ultimate objective is. in fact, to explore whether 
there are any lessons to be learned to ease the policy credibility problem
Our analysis is similar in motivation to that of Horder (1996: 20). which also 
emphasises how the performance of the Russian economy heavily depended, along 
with structural factors, on the choices of the authorities in charge. For example, we 
discussed in ¡exchange Rate l 'mlervalnation in the Absence o f Perfect Capital 
Mobility: the Russian Case how in the early 90's - either for tenacious belief or 
personal interest - Russian monetary authorities kept on clearing out enterprise debts, 
in particular the chairman of the CBR. Viktor Gerashchenko, was emphatically 
defined by the Economist as the 'worst central banker ever' for his remarkable 
inclination towards expansionary monetary policies. Various commentators have 
indeed emphasised how Gerashchenko's actions had a negative influence on the 
performance of the Russian economy
There are special occasions in history, when a country, in great financial difficulties, 
has a short-lived opportunity to implement the necessary economic reforms. Let us
suppose that the leaders decide to take on the task. Once these reforms are 
implemented, it may become difficult however to defend them - either for the lack of 
sustained political consensus or for the reaction of vested interests. That is why to 
design policies that can hold out against calls for reversal is very important.
For example recent literature has paid great attention to the programme adopted bv 
the Estonian government, which has consisted on the introduction of a currency 
board system, in July 1992. As is well known, discretionary monetary policy is not 
possible with a currency board because domestic currency is issued onlv against 
foreign exchange at a fixed exchange rate. Hanke. Jonung and Schuler ( 1993) argue 
that if a currency board had been established in Russia, policy makers would have 
been forced to embark on a programme of financial discipline IJy contrast, we tend 
to agree more with the doubts raised by Humpage ( 1996) and Horder ( 1996) on the 
feasibility of such a scheme in Russia Potential objections might be imagined to the 
appropriateness of a fixed exchange rate scheme in the circumstances that Russia 
had Though the key objection is. in our view, that a currency board system would 
have compelled the Russian government to depend exclusively on non-inflationary 
financing.
Could Russia renounce the large seigniorage revenues that according to several 
analysts were higher than 30°o of GDP in 1992'’ This seems quite unlikely, if we 
keep in mind that not just the government, but several enterprises and most of the 
banking system relied on this source of financing (see section 1.22)1 In addition.
'M ore likely to succeed was the programme adopted by Russia in 1995, which combined a fixed 
exchange rate system to the monitoring of Net Domestic Assets, defined as monetary base minus net 
international reserves According to Skidelsky and Halligan (1996: 18) “The IMF decided that the 
current programme should employ the concept o f NDA, the usual analytical framework within which to 
peg a currency, as additions to reserves offset monetary growth The important point is that if the 
government prints rubles and uses them to buy hard currency, NDA does not grow even though the 
domestic money supply has increase” With such system, collection of seigniorage is still possible, but 
constrained bv the fixed exchange rate regime This policy is however subject to reversal
financial markets would have not probably given much credit to the promise of a 
monetary policy consistent with zero seigniorage“
The reader may refer to Horder (1996), among other commentators, for a 
comprehensive discussion about other solutions that can help promote economic 
stability, such as conditional assistance, reform of the political process, and currency 
reform'
What this essay gives special attention to. is the solution proposed bv the time 
inconsistency literature As shown in section 3.3 our model reaches the standard 
conclusion that Russia would ha\e been better off by appointing a suitably 
conservative central banker As we have assumed an open economy a-la-Dombusch. 
financial markets are able to foresee a tighter monetary stance in the future On the 
basis of this, our analy sis reaches the conclusion that optimal monetary delegation 
would have eased the policy credibility problem in Russia, with the following 
important consequences:
I) in first place, the size of the Russian real exchange rate undervaluation would
have been smaller.
‘ Huntpage (1996) has raised this point by asking the following question without budgetary, banking 
and market reforms, could a Russian currency board reduce the time inconsistency problem ’”
(joldman (1996 I lb-1 17) criticism of Gaidar, for not having implemented a currency reform in 1992, 
has given rise to much controversy According to Skidclsky and llalligan (1990 22-23) "Goldman 
does not discuss the feasibility of implementing a successful currency reform in the conditions which 
the reformers faced the lack of preparation for such reform, the recent failure o f  two previous efforts, 
the lack of information about the extent of monetary overhang, the complications o f the ruble zone, and 
above else, the acute food shortage which meant that getting food back into the shops was the most 
urgent priority " Similarly. Horder (1996 24) underlines how a currency reform does not help improve 
the policy credibility problem of the government for the reason that "monetary confiscation might 
reduce people's confidence in money even further, causing prices to rise in any case or necessitating 
even greater monetary reform In addition monetary reform would not have changed the basic 
incentives lo cause higher inflation in ihe future”
2) in second place, economic agents would have decided to economise less on 
money holdings4.
Optimal monetary delegation turns out to be, in fact, a suitable approximation to the 
ideal time inconsistent solution. Comparing the latter with the currency board system 
adopted in Estonia, the important difference is that monetary policy delegation still 
allows the government to collect some seigniorage.
Finally, in section 3.4 we briefly review an alternative monetary arrangement, 
namely the setting up of an optimal feedback rule for monetary policy As it turns 
out, this latter option allows us to approximate the time inconsistent solution better 
than an optimal central banker Some doubts, of course, remain on whether it is 
feasible to establish a feedback rule which the government cannot suddenb render 
null and void, at his own discretion
Despite the plausibility of this analysis, there is one feature of the model which, in 
our view, does not adequately describe the true Russian economic experience. As 
was pointed out in chapter I. it is not entirely satisfactory to assume perfect capital 
mobility for a country which undergoes a process of economic transition Under 
these circumstances policy makers generally do not allow capital account 
convertibility as they attempt to prevent a harmful capital flight'
For this reason we felt the need in chapter I to develop a slightly more complex 
model the starting point was to relax the assumption of perfect arbitrage between 
domestic and foreign assets and to choose instead the alternative notion of currency
4Therefore the steady state tax base for seigniorage would have remained larger 
As regards the Russian experience, we discussed how even current account convertibility turned out 
to be a difficult achievement
substitution We maintain that this kind of analysis gives a satisfactory explanation 
for the rouble undervaluation in the early 90's and for the simultaneous increase in 
the stock of foreign exchange held by the Russian private sector In this economic 
setting foreign exchange is essentially required as an inflation hedge When 
economic agents expect an expansion in the growth rate of money, they attempt to 
defend themselves from the forthcoming losses by switching their portfolio to 
foreign exchange. If this demand is to be satisfied in some way, the real exchange 
rate must therefore depreciate at once to allow the necessary hard currency inflow, 
by attracting tourists and making exports more competitive
The objective of section 3 4 is to add the time consistency constraint to this currencv 
substitution model. The most interesting aspect of this exercise is to verify how the 
government's lack of credibility brings about an excessive undervaluation of the 
exchange rate combined to an excessive net accumulation of foreign exchange. In 
conclusion, the analysis suggests that, even in this different economic setting, the 
appointment of a conservative central banker remains a satisfactory response to the 
time consistency problem. Such an arrangement, in fact, allows the policy maker to 
reduce both the exchange rate undervaluation and internal capital llight The greater 
credibility of a conservative central banker persuades economic agents to lessen their 
demand for hard currency as a store of value Hence, the exchange rate 
undervaluation has to be less extreme
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3.2 Empirical Relationship between Competitiveness and 
Real Balances in Russia
The present section examines whether the empirical data at our disposal give some 
support to the theoretical analysis developed up to now. To reach this objective we 
employ monthly data, gathered from a recently established journal. Russian 
Economic Trends. As before c , stands for the logarithm of the real exchange rate 
while / for the logarithm of real balances''. As discussed in Exchange Rale 
Undervaluation in the Absence o f Perfect Capital Mobility: the Russian Case, these 
data are not entirely reliable for the following two reasons:
1) in first place, official foreign exchange markets have been, at least in the early 
90's, very 'thin', as exporters were not willing to surrender hard currencies. As a 
matter of fact, foreign exchange supplies partly depended on the CBR deploy ment 
of reserves;
2) m second place, the rouble exchange rate was also critically influenced by all 
the complex surrender and exemption rules
If. despite all these considerations, we plot the real exchange rate, c and real 
balances. / the following figure is obtained (Fig. 3. | ),
" The nominal exchange rale is the monthly weighted average value in the Moscow Interbank Foreign 
(urrenev Exchange, monev supply is M2, the price level is the CPI value All variables are taken from 
Vol S I loop Finally, the real exchange rate is defined as the fraction between the nominal exchange 
rale and domestic prices
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which is remarkably similar to Fig. 2.5. Estimating an OLS regression we derive.
c = -2.92 + 1.52/
where both parameters are significant at the 1% level in terms of I ratio. The slope 
of this relationship can incidentally be compared to the value which we had 
previously calculated in Simulation A (k = 1.31853) .
It is not our intention to overplay the statistical significance of the above figure. 
While both variables have the same order of integration, the Engle-Granger 
procedure denies the existence of a cointegrated vector, at least for the case where 
the variables are expressed as logarithms. When, on the contrary, the real exchange 
rate and real balances are estimated in levels there is some evidence that a long run 
relationship between the two variables does exist - the residual of the regression is in 
fact integrated of order 0 at the 5% significance level.
In view of the data problems discussed here, we also explore whether the key Buiter 
Miller model economic insight is relevant for the Russian experience According to 
this analysis, when expansionary monetary policies are expected, the real exchange 
rate has to be initially weak and recover thereafter to compensate for the low real 
interest rates As far as Russia is concerned, we believe that this is broadly consistent 
with our model. As suggested by Aslund. at the beginning of the adjustment process 
(Aslund, 1995:182):
It is also possible to establish a negative relationship between the black market exchange rate and real 
balances We would obtain an almost identical visual pattern to Fig 3 I and. here as well, the 
parameters of the regression would be significant at the 1% level t his is not surprising, considenng 
that both the ollicial and the black market series have a similar (rend (see Fig I (>) We have already 
discussed how throughout the first half o f 1002 the official foreign exchange figures, as published in 
Russian Economic Trends, overestimate the undervaluation of the rouble On the other hand the 
available black market sample series is much shorter - April 01 - November 02
x Jc
Consider lhal —  =  I — 7T 
cl!
"the whole concept of commercial borrowing was alien to the socialist mind. In 
the old system, credit had been fairly automatic for big state enterprises, and 
much of enterprise investment had been funded through the state budget”.
Large enterprises did not even need to borrow at demanding commercial rates as the 
CBR would deal with their debts. Of course all this could not possibly last for long. 
Soon managers had to leam to cope with rising real interest rates. While this took 
place, the real exchange rate gradually approached its estimated PPP value.
One further point should be emphasised. Several commentators have indeed 
recognised that, in line with our model Russian real balances adjusted slowly, at least 
relative to the highly inflationary climate. Of course, this is not surprising as time is 
generally necessary for economic agents to economise on cash holdings and for 
enterprises to speed up payments procedures.
If, however, we carefully inspect Fig. 3.2 there has been one exception to this general 
rule: Russian real balances suddenly collapsed in January 1992 To understand why 
this happened, recall that at the end of 1991 Russia was subject to price controls For 
this reason, real balances continued to increase artificially, determining a lower 
interest rate and weaker exchange rate. When in January 1992 Gaidar finally decided 
to liberalise several administrative prices, a considerable reduction of the existing 
monetary overhang, and a sudden strengthening of the real exchange rate, were 
inevitable' Our model does not describe all these events because it simply 
postulates a sluggish, but still flexible, price level. If temporary price controls were 
to be included, the analysis would account for the January 1992 fall in real balances. 
Nonetheless it would also become, at the same time, much more complex.
’ The jump in the price level was essentially due to credit rather than to cash emission and hence for 
some time the Russian economy experienced a cash crisis
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3.3 Delegation of Monetary Policy to a Central Banker
Following the large amount of literature on the time consistency issue, the question 
to be posed is whether it is possible to improve on the time consistent solution by 
appointing an independent central banker (Rogoff, 1985). At the present stage of the 
analysis this has become a simple task to achieve. Let us, in fact, suppose that 
monetary policy is delegated to a central banker, who has the same loss function of 
the government but has a different weight for inflation equal to a The procedure 
which should be followed to determine the new time consistent paths is entirely 
analogous to the one that we examined in section 2.6 By simply substituting a with 
a in the loss minimisation process, we instantly find the correct solutions to our 
problem, similarly labeled as:
Here it is possible to examine how the solution paths change when monetary policy 
is assigned to a central banker. Above all. it is possible to verify whether the time 
consistency problem can be dealt with
v s , K , i p , l ,</,c ,/r, i]
The associated loss is then derived by calculating the following expression
3.1)
111 The central banker perceives a higher loss equal to
I 19
To reach these objectives let us return to the same numerical example that we 
examined in Time Consistency in an Open Economy, a-la-Dornhusch (Simulation 
A). In Table 3.1 we report the results of our simulation, which are obtained by 
vary ing the degree of central banker aversion to inflation. For each different weight 
given to inflation, U we firstly derive the stable eigenvalue, vj, as the only negative 
solution to a fourth degree equation; we subsequently derive the slope o f the stable
eigenvector V
V*7
and we, finally, calculate the time consistent paths for the
endogenous variables, the associated loss. /. and the steady state for real balances, 
7* and for inflation, Jr*.
T able 3.1 The C onsequences of M onetary  Policy D elegation a s  a  
Function  of th e  C en tra l B ank Preferences
a vv L 7* k <P K *
0.01 -0.723657 98.2477 -3.95955 1.67935 0.003466 1.97978
1 -0.535966 80.7609 -1.97585 1.39578 0.12872 0.987927
2 -0.49172 28.3931 -1.3113 1.31853 0.156672 0.655565
2.16 -0.487628 28.359 -1 24414 1.311 16 0.159223 0.622071
3 -0.472133 28 9077 -0.98097 1.28285 0 168768 0.490484
5 -0.454001 31.0749 -0.65235 1.24897 0 179773 0.32617
100 -0.42336 39 3077 -0.03857 1.1897 0.198195 0.019283
Among all the possible weights, ¿7 = 2 is a special case, because the central banker 
has exactly the same preferences of the government and it is hence the 'government' 
time consistent solution, as was derived in section 2.6. In analogy to the classic time
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consistency literature, we verified that loss is higher with time consistent 
expectations ( /. = 28.3931) than with time inconsistent expectations ( /. = 28.3568). 
The first aspect to focus on is whether it is possible to improve on the time consistent 
solution by delegating monetary policy to a 'conservative' central banker. In our 
simulation, for example, the optimal central banker is indeed 'conservative' because 
he (or she) has a weight for inflation which is greater than 2, as it is equal to 2.16 If 
the optimal central banker is appointed, the loss is in fact reduced to 28.359, closer 
to the target of 28.3568 associated to the time inconsistent solution.
The second aspect to consider is to understand why loss diminishes by appointing an 
optimal central banker: for this reason we plot the time inconsistent (ZZ), the time 
consistent (GG) and the optimal central banker (BB) paths for inflation (Fig. 3.3)" . 1
F ig . 3.3 The New D ynam ics of Inflation  w ith  an  O ptim al C en tra l 
B anker
11 The time inconsistent paths are drawn as thicker lines for visual clarity
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The interesting aspect of Fig. 3.3 is that the government time consistent path for 
inflation (path 'GG') is always above the corresponding time inconsistent path (path 
‘ZZ’). This is precisely what we expected, given that economic agents with time 
consistent expectations are able to foresee that the government wishes to inflate the 
economy more than it had first announced. As a consequence, there is a role for an 
optimally conservative central banker, because the corresponding solution path for 
inflation is lower (path ‘BB’): an optimally conservative central banker is in fact 
capable of reducing the inflationary bias induced by the government's lack of 
credibility.
A first issue to address is the following: if the difference between the various 
solutions is quite small, then it becomes hardly worthwhile to appoint a central 
banker Indeed, in our simulation the difference between the central banker solution 
and the time consistent solution is noteworthy, but not huge: for example, inflation is 
initially 5.5 per cent smaller with the optimal central banker than with the time 
consistent solution, with the difference progressively falling to 3.4 per cent We 
leave to Appendix A & B to show how the larger the discount rate, £, and the semi­
elasticity of money demand. /. the stronger the case for appointing a conservative 
central banker. In Appendix C we also consider the special case where the discount 
rate is assumed to be equal to zero: in such a particular case, even if the time 
consistency problem does not disappear, monetary policy delegation turns out to be 
the wrong response.
A second important issue to concentrate on is the following: anv evaluation error 
regarding the true preferences of the central banker may prove to be extremely 
costly. If, for example, the appointed central banker turns out to be a "monomaniacal
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inflation fighter'* 12 with a weight to inflation equal to ¿7 = 5, the inflation path is 
extremely deflationary: thus it approximates rather poorly to the time inconsistent 
path and loss surges to 31.07491'.
Consider how the main economic insight of the whole analysis, so far presented, can 
be summarised with just one figure. To show this we plot both the time consistent 
and the optimal central banker solutions, taking as coordinates the real exchange 
rate, c and real balances. / (see Fig. 3.4). Basically Fig. 3.4 is nothing more than an 
extension of the key Buiter Miller figure (Fig. 2.1) to a time consistency framework
F ig . 3.4 C om parison betw een the  Time C onsisten t and  the Optim al
C en tra l B anker Solution: a Less R em arkable U ndervaluation
,  A
B
'‘ Term adopted in Blanchard ( 1089 610)
11 Conversely, in the traditional time consistency analysis it is shown that, in the absence of supply
shocks, the more anti-intlationary the central banker, the lower the loss
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The time consistent adjustment path, which we looked at in the previous chapter, is 
labelled on Fig. 3.4 as BD On the same figure we also plot now the stable manifold 
associated to the optimal central banker, here labelled as EF.
In section 3.2 we verified how in the early 90's the Russian adjustment process was 
effectively characterised by a simultaneous strengthening of the real exchange rate 
and a progressive fall in real balances. In terms of policy, our model seems to 
suggest that if only Russia had chosen an optimally conservative central banker, the 
adjustment path would have been still similar but less harmful The Russian 
economy would have jumped to a point E, instead of B. and at the end of the 
adjustment process it would have reached steady state F. instead of D In other words 
this analysis suggests that if a more credible central banker than Gerashchenko had 
been in control of monetary policy, financial markets would hav e correctly forecast 
the greater efforts to reduce monetary expansion. For this reason the real exchange 
rate undervaluation would have been less remarkable and so would have been the 
reduction of money holdings,J.
As a final consideration to this section consider what would have happened, for 
example, if a radically conservative central banker had been appointed: while this 
would have surely meant a considerably reduced real exchange rate undervaluation, 
nonetheless the chosen growth rate of money supply would have not been enough to 
guarantee a sufficient amount of seigniorage. This seems to indicate that under 
economic circumstances similar to those Russia was coping with, a certain degree of 
exchange rate undervaluation should be accepted. 14
14 In order to apply the analysis to the Russian economic experience, we chose, in view of the large 
monetary overhang, a relatively high' value for real balances (/,, =  0 ) .  if. on the other hand, the 
process o f economic convergence had begun with economic agents being short of liquidity, the 
adjustment process would have then been characterised by an overvalued' exchange rate (see 
Appendix D)
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3.4 Alternative Monetary Arrangement: Optimal Feedback 
Solution
As described in the previous section, one way of dealing with the government lack of 
credibility is to delegate control of monetary policy to a conservative central banker. 
In such a way, it is possible to reach a suitable approximation to the ideal, but not 
attainable, time inconsistent solution.
The classic alternative to monetary policy delegation is to choose a feedback rule for 
monetary policy. Even in this theoretical framework, we can confirm the standard 
result that a properly chosen feedback solution is able to approximate the time 
inconsistent solution better than a conservative central banker.
To show this, assume that the growth rate of money is set as a linear function of the 
state variable, / ,
3.2) 7 = &), + <w,/ ,
and that the two parameters, a>t and w 2 are constants.
The Buiter and Miller model is then reduced to the following system of differential 
equations:
3.3) d<-' Q  - ( / T ' + o ) , )  - 0 e r  c O. -a )
dt J L
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Moreover, we determine that the steady state value for real balances is still negative,
and the steady state real exchange rate returns to equilibrium.
3.5) c* = 0.
If we impose the assumption that the forward looking variable jumps on the stable 
manifold, the solutions are then equal to the following equations:
3.6) / = (/„ - l* )e r ' +1*
3.7) c = <?,(/„
where p, is defined as the stable eigenvalue of the system and 
eigenvector. Defining f  as:
as the stable
3.8) <t>y,i 1 + (ficrO, + co,
n
inflation and monetary growth can be shown to be equal to:
3.9) jt= r(/„ -l* )c '’-' - A ' / *
3.10) rj = co2( lu - 1 -  A .1/ *
126
Let us now assess whether is possible, for the same parameter values of Simulation 
A. to improve on the time consistent solution with an optimal feedback rule. To each 
set of parameters, and co2, a different solution path corresponds for inflation and 
monetary growth and a different loss level, /. . Loss can hence be plotted as a 
function of the these two parameters, ru, and &>,:
F ig . 3.5 Three-D im ensional Plot of L oss as  a  F unc tion  of th e  Two 
P a ra m e te rs  of the Feedback R ule
For the parameters above chosen, the three dimensional function has a minimum at 
the following values.
L
oj, = 01888
ra, = -0.3483
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which determine the optimal feedback rule We can verify that the corresponding 
solution paths for inflation and the growth rate of money (Fig. 3.6) are a very good 
approximation to the time inconsistent paths.
Fig. 3 .6  R esem blance betw een  th e  O ptim al Feedback Rule and  the 
Ideal T im e Inconsisten t Solution
n
0 . 6 6  
0 . 6 4  
0 . 6 2
0. 58
0 . 5 6  
0 . 54
For this reason, it is not surprising that loss is reduced to 28.3569, getting closer to 
the level which corresponds to the time inconsistent solution:
T ab le  3.2 Short S um m ary  of Solutions
Government
Solution
Optimal 
Central Banker 
Solution
Optimal
Feedback
Solution
lime
Inconsistent
Solution
Loss 28 3931 28.359 28 3569 28.3568
Steady State 0.6556 0.6221 0.6185 0 6197
Inflation
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The approximation to the time inconsistent solution has improved for the reason that 
when a feedback rule is chosen it is possible to control two weights. ro,and , 
while when a central banker is appointed only one, U15 16 Some doubts, of course, 
remain on whether it is really feasible to establish a feedback rule which the 
government cannot suddenly render - when the right time comes - null and void1''
15 Associated to each U a pair of parameters W and G7, corr.y .-r.-, We verified that the so! - '  '."-5 
determined with the Cohen and Michel technique for an> a  .■ •- ,olutions determined with TT 
and nr, are identical
16 Such issue is beyond the purposes of our thesis
129
3.5 Currency Substitution Extension
Up to now we have emphasised how the need to print money for financial purposes 
raises a time consistency issue concerning the control of monetary policy. The main 
economic argument is that the financial markets of a country which relies on 
seigniorage to finance its debt is able to foresee that the government has an incentive 
to promise a future rigorous monetary policy, but not to honour its commitment. This 
ability to anticipate the real policy tends to weaken the exchange rate
Henceforth, the important message of the model in terms of policy is that 
macroeconomically unstable countries, as for example Russia in the early 90's, 
would be better off by delegating monetary policy control to a conservative central 
banker The basic economic insight is that the greater credibility of the central 
banker strengthens the exchange rate, dampening hence both demand pressure and 
inflation.
To get to these conclusions we examined the time consistency problem in the 
dynamic framework of a Dornbusch open economy. Our approach has been to 
extend the Buiter and Miller model by assuming that monetary policy was no longer 
exogenous but was rather endogenously determined by the government as the 
solution to a loss minimisation problem.
However, among all the assumptions of the Dombusch literature there is one which 
requires perfect capital mobility. As previously mentioned, this hypothesis does not 
seem entirely plausible for countries in great financial difficulties. The key argument 
is that, in these circumstances authorities, generally adopt restricting measures with 
the objective to impede the development of flight of capital.
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For this reason we believe that it is preferable to begin with the alternative 
assumption of currency substitution between domestic and foreign assets.
Given the above considerations, let us go back to the currency substitution model 
that we examined in Exchange Rate Undervaluation in the Absence o f Perfect 
Capital Mobility: the Russian Case. We discussed how its general structure appears 
at first quite complex because it involves three different variables - the real exchange 
rate, c , real balances, / and stock of foreign exchange, .r. However, it has proven to 
be possible to simplify the model without losing its basic insight. The reason is that 
two variables, real balances, / and stock of foreign exchange, x have the distinctive 
feature of being negatively correlated
From an economic point of view this seems to be fairly reasonable: when economic 
agents switch their wealth away from money holdings, hard currencies are precisely 
what they are most likely to invest in
From a mathematical point of view this relationship is described by the following 
equations (see chapter I ):
3.11)
3.12) - p p ' l
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The logical implication of all these considerations is that the model that we 
presented in chapter 1 can be, for the present purposes, expressed as a function of the 
real exchange rate, c and of real balances, / :
3.13)
~<jr
dt
de
. dt.
0 - d m '  0  '
T' ( l  + / r < r ' )  k ' - p U + _ - 7 _
The crucial and surprising feature is that, although the model starts from the 
hypothesis of currency substitution, it has nonetheless a dynamic structure which is 
extremely similar to the one of the Buiter and Miller model (compare 3 13 with 2.24 
& 2.25).
This is an extremely helpful property: as a direct result it becomes absolutely 
straightforward to endogenise monetary policy in perfect analogy to the way this was 
accomplished in Time Consistency in an Open T'.conomy. a-la-Dornhusch. It is 
therefore possible to examine what are the consequences of the government's lack of 
credibility on the stock of foreign exchange held by the private sector in a different 
economic setting, characterised by currency substitution
Suppose that the government minimises once again the following loss function:
2.29) A = X “* 1 +^n~ nYy- i^
subject to the system of differential equations 3 13).
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With the same mathematical techniques employed in Time Consistency in an Open 
Economy, a-la Oornbusch, it is possible to derive the time inconsistent, time 
consistent and the optimal central banker solutions. Consider how the economic 
insight of such analysis can be summarised by the following figure:
F ig  3.7 O p t i m a l  M o n e t a r y  P o l i c y  D e l e g a t i o n  i n  a n  E c o n o m y  w i t h o u t  
P e r f e c t  M o b i l i t y  o f  F i n a n c i a l  C a p i t a l
c  A
B
D
F
Given our initial conditions, the economy starts off at point A. Suppose, to begin 
with, that the government is in control of monetary policy. Once again, the 
government has the incentive to promise a tight monetary policy but time consistent 
financial markets foresee that the government is unlikely to keep faith with this 
commitment. Since financial markets expect an inflationary monetary policy, they 
increase their foreign exchange demand to defend themselves from the forthcoming
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losses. As a result, demand for foreign exchange largely exceeds the supply of 
foreign exchange available in the domestic economy.
The implication is that the real exchange rate must devalue at once - jumping from 
point A to point B - to allow the necessary net accumulation of foreign exchange, by 
attracting tourists and making exporters more competitive. The real exchange rate 
has to remain weak for some time to allow the process of internal capital Bight to 
continue until financial agents are able to fully satisfy their portfolio demand of 
foreign exchange. On Fig. 3.7 the economy gradually slides from point B to point D. 
which is the new steady state of the system.
On the other hand, consider what happens if monetary policy is delegated to an 
optimal central banker. Time consistent economic agents still expect an inflationary 
process but a smaller one: hence they reduce foreign exchange demand As a 
consequence the real exchange rate needs to devalue less, because the net 
accumulation of foreign exchange has to be not as great. The economy jumps now 
from point A to E. before gradually sliding to F1 . Henceforth, by appointing a 
conservative central banker the overshooting effect and internal capital flight are 
reduced. 7
I7.\n interesting point o f this analysis is that when internal capitla flight increases contemporaneously 
liquidity must fall Therefore this currency substitution model can also be graphically represented with 
Fig 3 4 For this reason, it is perfectly consistent with the evidence shown in section 3 2
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3.6 Final Remarks
Economies in great financial difficulties, such as Russia, are frequently characterised 
by a large undervaluation of the exchange rate To shed some light on this, we have 
extended the logic of the Dornbusch model to a time consistency framework, 
emphasising how expectations of future monetary policies play a decisive role. As 
far as Russia is concerned, there seems to be some evidence which broadly supports 
this theoretical analysis.
This begs the question whether institutional reform would have been the appropriate 
response to the government policy credibility problem. Recent literature has 
explored, for example, the possibility of a currency board system
The kev policy implication we have explored in this chapter is whether it would have 
been possible to ease the Russian policy credibility problem by appointing a 
conservative central banker. Indeed, the standard result that monetary policy 
delegation successfully enhances the credibility of a stabilisation programme holds
too radically conservative central banker as the chosen deflationary monetary policy would not have 
generated an adequate amount o f seigniorage. In addition, there is another reason why the central 
banker should not be too conservative If monetary policy is in fact delegated to a radically 
conservative central banker, time consistent financial agents foresee future restrictive monetary 
policies hence the exchange rate response is to revalue at once Inevitably the greater strength of the 
exchange rate has a recessionarv effect on the economy, harming the export sector As a matter of fact 
until now we have ignored the importance of output, since our discussion has largely focused on the 
seigniorage issue From a technical point of view, it is possible to capture the above economic insight 
by extending the Kydland and Prescott model to a sticky price open economy setting - with the same 
mathematical techniques adopted so far Let us suppose that the government minimises one of the two 
following loss functions
However, it is important to keep in mind that it would have been harmful if Russia had appointed a
A)
I
B)
I
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What is very interesting, in our view, is the possibility of extending the key Buiter 
Miller figure to the context of monetary delegation Our study reaches the conclusion 
that if Russia had replaced Gerashchenko by appointing a suitably conservative 
central banker, the adjustment path would have remained similar but less harmful. 
Enhanced credibility signifies both a smaller real exchange rate undervaluation and 
larger liquidity (see Fig. 3.4).
Furthermore, we have proposed in this chapter an extension of the model by letting 
currency substitution, between domestic and foreign assets, be the alternative 
assumption to perfect mobility of financial capital This framework provides some 
interesting economic insights, which seem to broadly describe the Russian 
stabilisation process. While the dynamic structure of the model remains largely 
similar - being consistent with the empirical evidence of a negative relationship 
between competitiveness and liquidity - the economic interpretation is considerably 
different.
Here, the weakness of the exchange rate basically reflects a large huge stock demand 
for foreign exchange. Even more important is that economic agents are able to 
substitute for local currency into foreign currency, not through capital account, but 
via the current account, which is what is meant by saying that capital flight is 
internal Finally, the research that we have developed here yields the following 
interesting result: the appointment of a conservative central banker in Russia would 
have also meant a reduction in internal capital flight (see Fig. 3.7).
subject either to the Buiter and Miller model (presented in section 2 3) or to the currency substitution 
model (presented in sections I 2 and 3 5) The next step is to derive the time inconsistent, time 
consistent and optimal central banker solution The second loss (unction turns out to be the easier ot 
the two. as the stable eigenvector coefficient, (p is always equal to zero It also turns out that this 
allows one to proceed analytically rather than with simulations
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In this appendix we wish to investigate what role is played in our analysis by the 
discount rate, A priori, we expect that the larger the discount rate, the greater is 
the incentive to distort the future to improve the present economic performance. To 
verify whether this is the case we plot the optimal time inconsistent monetary policy, 
for different values of the parameter £, while maintaining the other parameters as in 
Simulation A. For example, in Fig. AI we chose J; to be equal to 0, 20, and 25.
Fig. A l
Appendix A
The Impact of the Discount Rate
As expected, the greater the discount rate the greater the distortion of the steady 
state. For example, if the discount rate is as large as 20, the time inconsistent 
monetary growth converges to 28 6 per cent and therefore the distortion is, roughlv. 
equal to 38 per cent. The value of the discount rate also affects the shape of the real 
exchange rate as depicted in Fig. A2:
Fig. A2
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With a large discount rate, the real exchange rate is relatively strong for most of the 
process of adjustment, as it correctly anticipates the future recessionary monetary 
policies.
Finally, in Fig. A3, we plot inflation, which depends both on the optimal growth rate 
of money, through core inflation, and on the real exchange rate, through the effect of 
competitiveness on demand.
Fig. A3
With a large discount rate we expect the problem of time inconsistency to be more 
important, as a large distortion reveals itself to be unrealistic with the elapsing of 
time. Repeated simulation analysis indeed confirms that the greater the discount rate, 
the greater the gap between the time inconsistent and the time consistent paths1’. 
Hence it becomes more important to appoint a conservative central banker, or. 
alternatively, to establish a tight feedback rule. Simulation analysis in fact confirms 
that the larger the discount rate the more conservative the optimal central banker and 
the tighter the feedback rule need to be'".
'This confirms the result by Miller. Salmon and Sutherland (1991 147) that "the discounting
exacerbates the inefficiency of the time consistent policy"
*" Let us suppose, for example, that the discount rate increases from f = 0.05 to Ç = 0.1 It can be 
shown that the gap between the time inconsistent and the time consistent solutions becomes larger 
Simulation analysis confirms that the higher discount rate, the more conservative the optimal central 
banker should be in this particular case the weight on inflation must be equal to il = 2.28 (Table Al )
Table A. 1
a V L 7* k * <P n
001 -0 723634 57.9743 -3 95882 1 67932 0 003349 1.97941
i -0 535544 17 5139 -1 95546 1.39506 0 12318 0 9777292 -0 491377 14 8986 -1 29264 1 31791 0 149393 0 646322
2.28 -0 484316 14 8426 -1 17689 1 30516 0 153485 0588446
3 -0 471855 15 0219 -0 96523 1 28234 0 16062 0 482617
5 -0 453804 1 5 9668 -0 64061 1 2486 0 170814 0 320304
100 -0 453804 1 5 9668 -0 64061 1 2486 0 170814 0 320304
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Appendix B
Another crucial parameter of the analysis is the semi-elasticity of money demand. /.. 
In the traditional Buiter and Miller model, the exchange rate overshooting is 
particularly sensitive to the semi-elasticity of money demand. For a given exogenous 
monetary policy, the larger A is the greater the 'jump" of the exchange rate. In our 
analysis, however, the growth rate of money is endogenous and. hence, is also a 
function of the semi-elasticity of money demand.
We plot in Fig. Bl, the optimal time inconsistent paths of the growth rate of money 
for three different values of the parameter A , equal to 2, 8 . and 14
Fig. B l
The Impact of the Semi-Elasticity of Money Demand
When A is large, since the exchange rate is very sensitive to an expansionan 
monetary policy, the optimal monetary policy has to be relatively tight to avoid huge 
inflation. When /. is large, moreover, there is a great incentive for the government to 
distort the future, because the immediate benefit is considerable, due to the large 
overshooting effect.
The larger the diseouni rate, the greater the scope for a central banker, or for a feedback rule, hut the 
greater also the associated distortion of the steady state With cj = 0.1 , for example, the distortion is 
roughly equal to 7 8 per cent with a central banker, and equal to l> 6 per cent with a feedback solution 
(see Table A2)
Table A2
Government
Soution
Optimal Central 
Banker Solution
Optimal Feedback 
Solution
Time Inconsistent 
Solution
Lou 14 8086 14 8426 14 8324 14 8.3105
Steady State 
Inflation
0 6463 0 588440 0 5699 0 5614
It is interesting how the real exchange rate is affected by the value o f A  :
Fig. B2
X=2
The larger A is, the more sensitive the exchange rate becomes to monetary policy, 
and hence, the overshooting effect increases, despite monetary policy being tighter 
However, the larger A is the more sudden the real exchange rate revaluation, since it 
anticipates the future distortion of monetary policy. The overall impact on inflation 
is pictured in Fig. B3:
Fig. B3
t
As in the case of a large discount rate, with a large semi elasticity of money demand, 
the time inconsistency problem becomes more serious, since the government does 
not have the incentive to deflate the economy as much as it had announced Finally, 
simulation analysis suggests that the larger A is the more conservative the central 
banker, and the tighter the feedback rule should be, to approximate the time 
inconsistent solution
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Appendix C
Do We Have a Time Consistency Problem if the Discount Rate is 
Equal to Zero?
We discussed in Appendix A how the larger the discount rate, the greater the scope 
for appointing a central banker or for choosing a tight feedback rule. It is interesting, 
therefore, to verify whether there is still a time inconsistency problem, if the discount 
rate is equal to zero.
In the following Simulation B, we keep the same values for all the parameters as in 
Simulation A, except that we now suppose the discount rate to be zero Plotting the 
time inconsistent (ZZ) and the time consistent solution for inflation (GG), we obtain 
the following figure:
which is interesting for two reasons. The first is that the time consistent solution is 
again above the time inconsistent solution, suggesting that the government still has 
the incentive (although less than before) to inflate the economy more than it had 
initially announced. Thus we establish that, even when the future is considered to be 
as important as the present, the government still wishes to cheat. The second 
interesting aspect is that the time inconsistent solution converges to 0 666 and hence 
there is no distortion at all of the steady state. A distortion of the steady state, in fact, 
has to be avoided precisely because its infinite cost would not be discounted
In growth theory, a distortion of the steady state level of capital is only justified if the 
discount rate is positive. Similarly, in our model, the distortion of the steady state 
inflation is only justified when the discount rate is positive. The clear implication is 
that it is not appropriate to appoint a conservative central banker if the discount rate 
is positive, because it would bring about a permanent distortion of the steady state.
Fig. C l
t
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Nonetheless, it is still possible to reduce the time inconsistency problem by carefully 
choosing the feedback rule. In fact, with a feedback rule it is possible to control two 
weights, a) , and a>2, and there are, hence, two degrees o f freedom. Given a zero 
discount rate, one weight (i.e. one degree of freedom) is 'lost' to ensure that there is 
no distortion of the steady state. The other weight, instead, can be chosen to achieve 
a better approximation to the time inconsistent solution. Following this strategy for 
the parameters of Simulation B, we derive the optimal feedback solution. Plotting 
the feedback solution (FF) and the time inconsistent solution (ZZ) here below.
Fig. C2
we see how the feedback solution is a good approximation to the time inconsistent 
solution
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Appendix D
In Simulation A, the initial value of real balances was supposed to be equal to zero in 
view of the large monetary overhang in Russia. Conversely, let us now assume in the 
following Simulation C a low' initial value for real balances (equal to /„ = -2  ), 
while keeping the same values we had before for all the remaining parameters. Since 
the steady state money real balances is unchanged at /* = —1.24, it becomes 
necessary, this time, that real balances increase during the adjustment process. The 
implication is that there must be a 'negative' gap between inflation and monetarv 
growth (equation 2.51). If we plot in Fig. Dl the optimal time inconsistent paths for 
both the growth rate of money and inflation paths, in fact we have:
Fig. D l
The Impact of the Initial Value of Real Balances
The first reason why inflation is below the growth rate of money is that during the 
process of adjustment the real exchange rate is 'overvalued', as shown in the 
following figure:
Fig. D2
t
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The second reason for inflation to be below the growth rate of money is that the real 
exchange rate devalues in the process of adjustment, and hence the real interest rate 
is positive, dampening demand.
The conclusion is that the shape of the time inconsistent paths critically depends on 
the initial state of the economy. The real exchange rate is a particularly sensitive 
variable. If there is an initial monetary overhang, the exchange rate devalues (both in 
nominal and real terms), while, on the other hand, if there is an initial lack of 
liquidity, the exchange rate appreciates. A low initial value for real balances does not 
prevent, however, the time inconsistency problem to arise. The government, in fact, 
is still tempted to promise an unrealistically tight future monetary policy to 
encourage a stronger revaluation of the exchange rate aiming at reducing inflation 
As before, the time consistent solution turns out to be more inflationary than the time 
inconsistent solution and thus it is again possible to better approximate the time 
inconsistent solution by appointing a central banker or by establishing a feedback 
rule. The final surprising feature of the model is that the optimal central banker and 
the optimal feedback rule depend on the initial value of real balances. For example 
the optimal central banker has a weight for inflation equal to 2.13 while for 
Simulation A the optimal weight is 2.16 (see Table D1).
T ab le  D1
a v L J* K <P It*
0.01 -0.723657 86.8805 -3.95955 1.67935 0003466 1.97978
1 -0.535966 29.7308 -1.97585 1.39578 0.12872 0.987927
2 -0.49172 25.8732 -1.311 13 1.31853 0.156672 0.655565
2.13 -0.488358 25.8514 -1 25618 1.31247 0.158756 0.628088
3 -0.472133 26.3977 -0.980968 1.28285 0.168768 0.490484
5 -0.454001 28.4463 -0.652353 1.24897 0.179773 0.326176
100 -0.423336 36.1724 -0 038566 1.1897 0.198195 0.019283
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Chapter 4
In te rn a l C ap ita l F lig h t in  a B lack M a rk e t E xchange
R a te  Econom y
4.1 Introduction
This essay singles out the reasons why black market exchange rates develop and what 
are the likely consequences on the remaining macroeconomic system The analysis has 
so far largely ignored the possibility of foreign exchange leakages between official and 
black markets It is worth noting that to include two exchange rates, foreign assets and 
leakages in one single model has a cost in terms of techniques and economic tractabilitx 
For this reason, the task of specifying a formal framework for discussing the effects of 
monetary and exchange rate policies on the black market premium, was left to this final 
essay.
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Our motivation for this study derives from the empirical observation that several 
unstable economies with high inflation policies are characterised by foreign exchange 
leakages. The essay proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 highlights, first, the economic 
rational for the restrictive foreign exchange policies that cause the emergence of black 
markets. Second, in section 4.3 we briefly review some of the economic insights 
provided by the existing literature. Finally section 4.4 presents a stylised black market 
exchange rate model.
Our discussion starts from the following consideration: as is recognised by the existing 
literature, one important factor originating a black market exchange rate is the policy 
makers attempt to keep the domestic currency artificially overvalued. This has been, for 
example, the experience of several African and Latin American countries in the past
Whatever the reasons for this policy may be. one thing should be immediately clear: it is 
neither convenient nor sustainable to maintain in the long run an overvalued exchange 
rate unless current account convertibility is restricted. To show this, assume without loss 
of generality that the foreign currency considered is the dollar and define the exchange 
rate as the price of foreign currency. Let us subsequently represent demand and supply 
for foreign currency as a function of the real exchange rate (see Fig. 4.1). Dollars are 
demanded from importers, who need to buy foreign goods and supplied by exporters 
selling the foreign currency gained abroad1
1 In general the slope of the supply curve is ambiguous but if the domestic country is small it will be 
positively sloped (Williamson. 1991 192-200)
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F ig .  4 .1 D e m a n d  a n d  S u p p l y  in  t h e  F o r e i g n  E x c h a n g e  M a r k e t
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When the exchange rate is kept at an overvalued level demand for dollars exceeds 
supply. If the country does not experience generous capital inflows, the authorities can 
sell foreign reserves to satisfy, as a temporary measure, the excess in dollar demand2 
However, this depletion of foreign reserves cannot last forever and it ultimately becomes 
necessary to impose some form of exchange rate restrictions in the official markets 
(Culbertson. 1989:1908) Thus, these economies are typically characterised both by 
limited current account and no capital account convertibility.
* Capital Hows may sustain the domestic currency, but at a certain point if the trade balance continues to 
worsen, the fear of a possible devaluation is likely to prev ail
147
A direct consequence of the lack of convertibility is that unsatisfied demand for hard 
currency spills over into the black market. Such a demand has a double nature 
(Dombusch and Kuenzler, 1993:107):
"First, the rationing of foreign exchange by quotas, licenses, absolute restrictions, 
or special exchange rates gives rise to a demand for foreign exchange to finance 
illegal imports and outlays abroad. Second, there is a portfolio demand for foreign 
exchange that needs to be satisfied in a black market if the government does not 
sell foreign exchange for that purpose, but economic agents want to hold foreign 
assets.”
Once exporters recognise the existence of this residual demand they may be willing to 
divert part of their foreign exchange into the parallel market. Trade misinvoicing is of 
course awarded with a black market premium Thus, exchange rate black markets have a 
'social' function because they allow economic agents to satisfy their foreign exchange 
demand.
In connection to this last consideration recall what we discussed in exchange Rate 
I hdervaluatton in the Absence of Perfect Capital Mobility: the Russian Case. The 
accumulation of foreign exchange as a store of value in that essay was described as 
internal capital flight' Such name was used for the reason that internal capital flight is 
a common alternative to real capital flight whenever capital account restrictions are in 
place. As an example we described in that essay Russia's economic experience We 
suggested that the accomplishment of current account convertibility in July 1992 and the 
simultaneous development of flexible (interbank and auction) exchange rate markets 
meant that hard currency demand could be satisfied, for the most part, through legal 
means
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However, whenever policy makers decide to restrict current account convertibility as 
well as capital account convertibility, hard currency demand turns to black markets In 
other words black markets provide an ultimate mechanism for foreign exchange 
accumulation. This process could be thought as yet another kind of internal capital 
flight, with the difference that this time foreign exchange is channelled illegallv.
4.2 Economic Rational for Restrictive Foreign Exchange Policies
Before going into the details of the analysis it is natural to try to understand why 
governments adopt restrictive policies that cause the emergence of black markets. One 
straightforward reason why the authorities may be tempted not to allow current account 
convertibility is the need of revenue. Multiple exchange rates, for example, are often 
devised with this intention. What policy makers do, is to select a set of overvalued 
exchange rates, which apply to exports, at the same time as to ration the demand-side of 
foreign exchange markets. Import rationing can be achieved either by devising a system 
of licenses or by selling foreign exchange at unfavourable prices.
In both cases the consequence is a strong incentive for importers to operate through 
illegal markets. For example, we described in section 1.12 that the Sov iet Union has 
been characterised by a complex system of multiple exchange rates, which lasted up 
until January 1992. Therefore it is not surprising that in those years black markets for 
foreign exchange held a quite significant role.
Revenues may also be earned by the state without requiring a multiple system of 
exchange rates but just by keeping the official exchange rate overvalued whilst rationing 
foreign exchange demand. A strong exchange rate, indeed, acts like an implicit tax on 
exports. For oil exporting countries this may be a considerable source of revenue.
For example, in Russia during the pre-unification period, between January and July 
1992, the structure of surrender requirements guaranteed the Russian authorities a
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significant revenue. The reason is that the export sector was subject to an overvalued 
'effective exchange rate" whilst the import sector, except for centralised imports, was 
offered foreign exchange at unfavourable prices (see section 1.13 and Table 130). In 
addition, the Central Bank of Russia provided the necessary resources to ensure that 
auction markets would take place in several circumstances. Therefore a supplementary 
source of revenue for the state depended on the spread between the auction rate, at 
which foreign exchange was sold, and the effective exchange rate, which applied to 
exports (see Fig. 1.2). In short, during the pre-unification period there was a clear 
incentive to exchange currencies on the black markets.
We hav e already suggested that one of the aims of Gaidar's reforms was to encourage 
exporters to act trough legal channels both by lessening the foreign exchange surrender 
rules and by establishing current account convertibility After the July 1992 foreign 
exchange reforms, the more favourable surrender rules and the further development of 
auction and interbank markets allowed hard currency stock demand to be. to a great 
extent, satisfied through legal means. Over time, the black market exchange rate 
premium became a less significant v ariable in Russia’
Apart from the revenue motivation, there may be additional explanations for an 
overvalued exchange rate, even though overvalued exchange rates may be extremely 1
1 To keep the analysis simple the model presented in chapter I assumed current account convertibility while 
neglecting foreign exchange leakages Moreover, in section I -t we inv estigated the role of export taxation 
Briefly summarising, we developed a dual exchange rate model, which did not admitted foreign exchange 
leakages By contrast in lliis essay we lake into account the possibility o f foreign leakages
151
dangerous4. Let us now review some of the economic circumstances when this may take 
place5:
a) Nominal Anchor
To begin with, sometimes it is the monetary authorities explicit policy to fix the 
exchange rate or to establish a crawling peg in the hope of importing low inflation 
and credibility from abroad. This, indeed, is a typical response of countries 
experiencing a process of hyper-inflation. If, however, wages and prices fail to adjust, 
a quick appreciation of the real exchange rate might develop, putting the entire 
export sector at risk If there are no capital inflows, as soon as the country runs out of 
reserves, the monetary authorities are forced to either devalue or restrict currency 
convertibility With regard to this, there is indeed an ongoing debate on whether the 
exchange rate should be a policy tool to achieve real targets or whether it should be 
the nominal anchor in stabilisation attempts This debate was for example reviewed 
by Corden (1993).
hi ll.xpansion in Domestic Demand
An increase in government spending may induce households to spend more on 
imports. Exporters have the incentive to bring back some of their exports into the 
domestic market. As a consequence the old exchange rate becomes overvalued
4 As pointed out by Dornbusch ( !l)88). if the overvauation of the exchange rate persists for only few years
the entire exportable sector may well be at risk, especially if exportables are easy to substitute This is the 
case when exports are goods characterised by a low technological input 
' The analysis broadly follows Dornbusch ( l‘>88)
c) O il Imparl Price Increases
If oil imports become more expensive, the domestic country reacts by reducing oil 
consumption The overall effect on demand for dollars therefore depends on import 
elasticity, but in general the demand for dollars increases and as a result the domestic 
currencv is overvalued.
J) l.oss o f Export Revenue
This may happen either when there is a recession abroad or when the price of one 
important export good falls. The direct consequence is that exporters supply less 
dollars to the foreign exchange market, and inevitably, the currency becomes 
overvalued.
e) Attempt to Hinder an Exchange Rate ( 'ollapse
In the prev ious essay s we described how countries in great need of seigniorage may 
be characterised by a very weak official exchange rate for the reason that economic 
agents correctly foresee future loose monetary policies. Under these circumstances 
foreign exchange demand has a portfolio component as well. The exchange rate 
weakness allow s an enhanced competitiveness of the exporting sector matched by the 
required hard currency inflow. Policy makers typically become anxious about the 
extent of the exchange rate undervaluation: often their response is to keep the official 
exchange rate artificially strong either through foreign exchange market intervention 
or by limiting the degree of convertibility of domestic currency Once more frustrated 
demand for hard currency is then diverted to black market exchange rates, especially
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so if the authorities persist with highly inflationary monetary policies. The exchange 
rate undervaluation ends up being transferred from the official to the black exchange 
rate market.
f) Exchange Rate as an Instrument o f Commercial Policy
Sometimes exchange rates and rationing are used as instruments of commercial 
policy to favour specific categories of importers over others" . In particular, importers 
of consumer goods are often penalised in the belief that a process of industrialisation 
starts off by favouring the acquisition of capital goods.
gj ( 'orruption
Finally, officials and bureaucrats may have an interest in maintaining a two-tier 
exchange rate system, as they are likely to have easy access to cheap dollars through 
the official market and make an easy profit by selling them on the parallel market.
' This is sometimes accomplished with a system of multiple exchange rates
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4.3 Some Interesting Ideas from the Existing Literature
The number of papers on the black market exchange rate is quite impressive, even if 
most of them have been published separately and the issue has generally failed to have 
an important role in standard economic textbooks. Our general impression is that 
although several themes are common to most of the literature there is not as yet a unique 
and fully satisfying methodology. The reason can probably be accounted for by the great 
difficulty of modelling in a formal framework two exchange rate markets where both 
cheating and convertibility rules hold a vital role. In our view, key papers of the existing 
literature are the four following articles: Dombusch et al. (1983), Pinto (1989), Morris 
(1995) and Agenor and Flood ( 1992).
The classic paper remains the article by Dombusch et al. The question the authors try to 
answer is relatively simple: what happens in a black market economy when money 
supply is expanded'.’
To tackle this question the authors need to postulate how money demand behaves. The 
great contribution of such authors to the black market literature is to assume that even in 
such economic setting there is currency substitution between domestic money and 
foreign money To be more precise, economic agents are supposed to demand a given 
proportion between domestic and foreign assets, which in turn depends on the difference 
between their expected rate of return. The thrust of the Dombusch et al analysis is that 
the ratio between domestic money and foreign currency is constant in the steady state; 
domestic residents are hence prepared to hold a higher level of money balances only if
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they can accumulate foreign currency as well. A short run increase in the black market 
premium allows a net accumulation of foreign currency, as exporters and tourists 
increase their inflow of dollars into the black market7. The solution to this model is that 
a money expansion leads to a short run increase in the premium and an increase in 
internal capital flight.
More recently the debate has shifted to a different question: what happens when the 
authorities attempt to unify the two exchange rates and liberalise trade by allowing 
current account convertibility of the currency'’ (eg. Pinto (1989), Morris (1995). Agenor 
and Flood (1992)). On several occasions, developing countries have carried out attempts 
of this kind, at times under the direct pressure of international institutions as the IMF or 
the World Bank In these circumstances a dev aluation of the exchange rate seems to be 
the best policy to improve the macroeconomic environment of a black market economy. 
A devaluation is. in fact, meant to reduce the black market premium, possibly unify the 
two exchange rates and finally start off a process of trade liberalisation
However matters are not always so simple Section 4 2 has highlighted that changes to 
the official exchange rate may have important fiscal implications. On several 
circumstances the need of revenue can explain why the governments of countries in 
great financial difficulties keep the exchange rate overvalued and maintain foreign 
exchange restrictions. On the basis of this. Pinto (1989 322) suggests that the reversal of 
these policies may require an increased need of money financing to compensate for the
Dornhusch el ill i I ‘>8.1) ignore ihe impact of money supply on the price level anil on reserves
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loss of revenue. It follows that an inflationary process begins, critically undermining the 
stabilisation attempt:
"The basic idea is simple: the fiscal deficit is financed partly by the revenues from 
the government's purchase of foreign exchange with the overvalued domestic 
currency, which serves as a tax on exporters. Gross revenue from the premium is 
an increasing function of the size of the wedge between the official and black 
market exchange rates. Unifying the official and black market rates obliterates this 
wedge so that the related revenues vanish. So. unless real government spending is 
simultaneously lowered or other compensating tax revenue raised, the fiscal 
deficit will widen. Given the time needed for fiscal reform and the limited menu 
of tax instruments available, the most likely outcome is that this additional deficit 
will be monetized, raising inflation ."
A more recent study by Morris (1995: 296) has shown, however, that foreign exchange 
liberalisation could have the opposite effect. There are some special circumstances 
when an official exchange rate devaluation has a positive fiscal impact on the 
government budget and hence reduce current inflationary pressures Morris argues this 
to be the case, for example, if the country is a net receiver of aid. In support of his view, 
he refers to his own experience as Economic Adv isor for Uganda's Ministry of Planning 
and Economic Development:
"In Uganda, external inflows of foreign capital easily outweigh debt obligations 
Governments receive a large proportion of resources in program aid' - grant or 
concessionary loans which provide foreign exchange to the Government to sell to 
the private sector, often for productive inputs, sometimes even for consumer 
goods. The local currency counterpart of these program aid funds then goes to 
support the Government budget The budget then stands to gain from devaluations 
of the budget. The budgetary situation of Uganda seems ty pical of many African 
countries.”
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The essential point of his discussion is that the government of Uganda was a net seller of 
foreign exchange to the private sector On similar circumstances a devaluation of the 
exchange rate acts like an implicit tax on the private sector. The policy message of this 
study seems to be that foreign aid helps unstable economies remove their foreign 
exchange restrictions.
Morris' paper is also interesting from a technical point of view, because it develops an 
equation for the black market current account that we later make use of. Naturally the 
amount of dollars on the black market rises if the black market current account is 
positive. The amount of dollars on the black market is crucial because it measures the 
stock of foreign exchange held by the private sector and hence the extent of internal 
capital flight
Agenor and Flood (1992) have developed a formal analysis about the consequences of 
exchange rate unification. Their model prov ides an interesting equation for reserves as a 
function of the black market premium They suggest that reserves diminish in the 
official market if the black market premium rises. The greater the premium, the more 
exporters have an incentive to under invoice their exports and divert their reserves into 
the black market. In a stabilisation process the dynamic of reserves is extremely 
important, as when they rise it becomes easier to improve the convertibility of the 
currency" *
* It is no longer strictlv necessary to start with a large quantity o f reserves at the beginning of the 
adjustment process
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4 .4 The Model
In this section our aim is to attempt to develop a stylised black market exchange rate 
model Suppose that the economy is characterised by the contemporaneous existence of 
both an official and a black market exchange rate. Suppose, in addition, that dollar 
demand is rationed in the official exchange rate market, either because of an overvalued 
exchange rate or because of import quantity restrictions. Frustrated demand spills over 
into the black market. Exporters are compelled by law to supply dollars into the official 
market; however if there is a black market premium, they are ready to under invoice 
their revenues and divert dollars into the black market. Similarly, foreign tourists have 
an incentive to sell dollars into the black market. In this economic setting the current 
account is therefore only partially convertible. Moreover let us assume that authorities 
do not allow capital account convertibility for the plausible fear of a real capital flight
Technically, we combine together a currency substitution equation, the Morris equation 
for the black market current account (modified) and the Agenor and Flood equation for 
reserves. The model can be reduced to a non-linear system of three differential 
equations. Subsequently we solve the model by applying the technique suggested by 
Dixit (1980) and Currie (1985) to determine the free variable (the black market 
exchange rate) as a function of the predetermined variables of the system. This allows us 
to examine what the impact effect is of exogenous changes of both money supply and of 
the official exchange rate on the black market premium
These are the variables in the model
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V ariable in  Logs V a ria b le  in  Levels
m M money supply
P P price level
X X dollars in the black market
sh sh black market exchange rate
0s s" official exchange rate
r R level o f reserves
p ' PT price o f tradables
P S P v price o f non tradables
w IV wealth
d D domestic credit
d D Exogenous component o f 
domestic credit
where the parameters are all positive unless otherwise stated
1. 11 Black M arket C u rren t Account
To start with it is necessary to postulate a black market current account equation Before 
we arrive at this let us first go back to the issue whether capital flights can take place in 
a black market economy. With perfect capital mobility, the standard development of 
capital (lights is. of course, perfectly legal: at some stage capital account outflows 
become so large that they need to be financed with current account surpluses - 
something that in turn requires tough adjustment policies. But in an economy, as the one 
just described, capital account convertibility is not permitted. Illegal accumulation of
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foreign exchange is. however, still possible if the black market current account is 
positive
In short, the black market current account equation measures the increase in internal 
capital flight. It is, in fact, not relevant how intensely residents demand foreign currency: 
if the quantity of dollars in the black market remains constant any extra demand would 
only push up the price of dollars, all in all preventing capital flights - incidentally this is 
precisely how a dual exchange rates economy works when the commercial and financial 
exchange rate markets are successfully kept separate
The question now is how dollars, .r can be accumulated in a black market. One way this 
could be achieved is by domestic residents selling their assets to foreigners To a large 
extent, however, this depends on whether the legal framework and the economic 
environment encourage foreign firms to buy such assets. The only other wav foreign 
exchange can increase in the parallel market is if exporters and tourists divert hard 
currency supplies from the official market to the black market. This diversion depends 
positively on the premium .v* -,v", where .v* is defined as the black market exchange 
rate and i" as the official exchange rate. Yet one must consider that there is also a loss 
of dollars from the black market. Rationed importers buy dollars from the black market. 
Black market imports depends negatively on the black market premium. s* -  
(Dornbusch et al., 1983: 29) and on the stock of private wealth. IF (Moms, 1993: 9).
At this stage of the analysis we can now specify a black market current account equation 
as follows:
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4.1) i;'[ir]>o
The quantity of dollars in the black market rises if the diversion of exporters and tourists 
from the official market9 - >") exceeds the quantity of dollars bought by importers
{ag[W]-<p(sh -.v11)}
Wealth is defined as the sum of money balances A/ and the value of dollars in domestic 
currency ShX  divided by the price level:
\ !  + ShX  
I’
Having postulated a black market current account equation it is now necessary to specify 
a money demand equation.
I. 12 A C u r r e n c y  S u b s t i t u t i o n  E q u a t i o n  for a B lack M arket Economy
The standard currency substitution literature suggests that economic agents compare 
assets on the basis of their expected rate ol return As described in h'.xchunge Rate 
lInJervahiation in the Absence <>; 'erfcct ( apital Mobility: ihe Russian ( use. with this
Morris assumes that supply of foreign exchange on the black market is exogenous: we maintain that it is 
more sensible to assume that the black market premium is relevant
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theory the assumption of perfect arbitrage between assets is relaxed. It is, in fact, argued 
that demand is not so sensitive to minimum changes in the expected rate of return. 
Conversely, it is assumed that the ratio in the stock level of two assets depends on the 
relative rate of return of the two assets. For example, in the classic article by Calvo and 
Rodriguez (1977) - where PPP is postulated - the ratio of money supply and foreign 
assets depends on the level of domestic inflation.
It is possible to write a similar expression for a black market economy. The difference in 
the rate of return between domestic and foreign money is given by the rate of 
depreciation of the exchange rate in the black market economy (Dombusch et al. 1983: 
27).
Consider moreover how the less reliable domestic currency is, the greater the demand 
for foreign currency. Thus an increasing black market premium indicates a growing 
unreliability' of the domestic currency, possibly due to a worsening in the level of 
rationing in the official market. This aspect is for example outlined by Frenkel ( 1990: 
162):
“we assume that stock demand for foreign assets depends positively on the 
premium which could be the result of several factors: the more the black market 
rate exceeds the official rate, the higher could individuals perceive the risk of the 
government adopting additional restrictive measures; as a consequence, they seek 
to change the structure of their wealth towards foreign assets. A higher premium in 
the black market may also have the effect that foreign currencies take over 
functions of money, in which case individuals would also want to change the 
structure of their portfolio accordingly”.
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10 In such a situation, a change in the official exchange rate does not affect money demand
1 Agenor and Flood (1992: 928) prefers not to employ a currency substitution equation but to utilise the
.  t/v* / * ,,vfollowing arbitrage equation between domestic and foreign bonds / =/ + —---- /As - a ) I hisdt
expression is correct when the repatriation of the principal on foreign bonds is achieved through the black 
market while the repatriation of interest receipts is achieved through the official market Eliminating the 
interest rate with a money demand equation, it is possible to get an expression not dissimilar from our own, 
however, we question its theoretical validity as it seems unlikely that in a black market economy foreign 
interest payments are received through the official market Such expression is generally used in the dual 
exchange rate literature, where of course it makes more sense (Flood and Marion 1983) The positive 
aspect is that it allows the author to greatly simplify the analysis
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4 .4 3  T h e  C o m p le te  M o d e l
Having presented the key features of the analysis, we now present the complete model 
The equations, expressed in logarithmic terms, are as follows:
4.3) J.v ■ = -kr'e'* (m -  .v* - x  + k ^ - ' 0 - k.
dt 1 v -
4.1) ilxdt = (# + ,»)(**
4.4) m = \{r + ,v'") + ( 1 -  \‘)d
4.5) d = j + i//d y <
4.6) p ' = 6k" + (l-0).v*
4.7) P =npr + ( • - '/ ) / ’ '
4.8) dr
~dt
II 1 1
There follows a brief description of each equation
4 3) is the currency substitution equation.
4 I) is the black market current account equation.
4 4) defines money supply as a weighted average between reserves, r valued in 
domestic currency and domestic credit, d ;
4.5) postulates that domestic credit not only has an exogenous component, J  but 
depends also on the official exchange rate. .v". We have already pointed out that a
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devaluation of the official exchange rate has an impact on money supply. To be 
precise, a devaluation of the official exchange rate has an impact on the growth rate 
of money supply but for sake of simplicity our analysis avoids adding another 
differential equation Let us suppose, to start with, that like in Pinto a devaluation of 
the official exchange rate has a negative fiscal impact and hence the money supply 
expands to meet this extra deficit. In this case y is positive. Conversely, imagine that 
foreign aid is large, as suggested by Morris. Governments receive grants and financial 
support for specific projects in foreign currency. When they sell foreign exchange to 
the private sector these governments reduce their deficit and the need to expand 
money supply. In this case y is negative12 *14;
4.6) defines the price of tradables as a weighted average of the black market 
exchange rate and the official exchange rate (Agenor and Flood. 1442: 927-928). This 
is based on the hypothesis that trade occurs both \ia the official market exchange rate 
and via the black market (Goldberg, 1995 172);
4.7) defines the price level as a weighted average of tradable and non tradable prices 
Since our aim is to examine the effect of a real devaluation, suppose that non tradable 
prices do not adjust 1';
4.8) controls the dynamic of reserves. The greater the black market premium, the 
more exporters are encouraged to under invoice reserves and transfer them into the 
black market (Agenor and Flood, 1992: 928)" "
12 To consider the special case when money supply is exogenous we just need to impose the restriction 
y = 0 This is a frequent assumption in the black market literature (for example Goldberg. 1995 171)
1 A special case, analysed by Agenor and Flood (1992 928). is to detine the price level as the price of 
tradables ( // I) Such a case, however, rules out the possibility of having a steady state real exchange 
rate devaluation I Inder this hypothesis the elfects of a devaluation are of a short run nature.
14 Since the currency is not fully convertible a positive premium, may be sustainable without a loss of 
reserves in the official market If. however, the premium is greater than t: . the restrictions are not
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4 .4 4  T h e  S te a d y  S t a t e
The government is capable of controlling two instruments: the exogenous component of 
domestic credit, d  and the official exchange rate, .v". Suppose for simplicity these 
variables are adjusted with unanticipated 'jumps', but the rate of growth of each remains 
equal to zero.
Consider, first of all, that reserves are constant in the steady state: thus the black market 
exchange rate has to converge to the official rate. Bearing in mind that the price of 
tradables is defined as a weighted average of the two exchange rates, the following 
identity then holds in the steady state:
Consider, moreover, that a change in the exogenous component of money supply. J . 
does not affect the steady state proportion of wealth that economic agents wish to hold 
in terms of domestic money Of course, the reason is that the black market exchange rate 
is stable in the steady state: *1
sufficient to avoid a loss in reserves because of increased export smuggling Following Agenor and Flood 
(1992: 928) in the present analvsis we assume - without loss of generality - t: = 0
1 ’ We have already mentioned that the official exchange rate is an implict tax on the export sector A 
possible extension to the present analysis would be to split the official exchange rate by including an export 
tax as in Goldberg (1995 171)
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In short any increase in d , unless matched by a devaluation of the official rate, brings 
about a long run corresponding fall in reserves. Therefore the money supply remains 
unchanged in the steady state. At a later stage of the analysis we discuss what the impact 
effect of a change in domestic credit is on the economic system.
Consider next how a devaluation of the official exchange rate leads to an equivalent 
long run devaluation of the black market exchange rate16 Moreov er a dev aluation of the 
official exchange rate leads to both a reduction in foreign assets, .y. and an increase in 
money supply, nr.
K < 0  * £ > 0
These two movements re-establish the long run ratio between money supply and the 
value of dollar, which is required from the currency substitution specification. In 
particular the foreign assets' fall can be interpreted as an internal capital flight' 
reduction.
16 The empirical black market literature focuses on whether the black market exchange rate and the official 
exchange rate possess a common trend For empirical evidence and further economic insight, see. for 
instance. Baghestani and Noer( I‘>d3)
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We have already summarised the debate between Pinto and Morris on whether foreign 
exchange reforms cause a higher rate of inflation. Our study is similar in motivation to 
that of Pinto and Morris but the sustainability of economic reform is here judged in 
terms of reserves. An increase in reserves, indeed, facilitates the opening up of trade and 
the removal of existing exchange rate restrictions. In our analysis we find that the 
overall effect of a devaluation on steady state reserves depends critically on y:
(if y is large) bad news case
Jr *
—— >0 (it y is small) good news case
Js
This seems to us an appealing result: y is the coefficient that captures the fiscal impact 
of the foreign exchange reform on the government budget The larger y is. the more 
domestic credit must increase to service an additional deficit. When y is sufficiently 
large, the consequent monetary policy entails a long run fall in reserves. When on the 
contrary y is small, reserves rise in the steady state17.
In sum. the model indicates that if an overvalued exchange rate acts like an implicit 
mean of taxation, an official exchange rate devaluation is not an easy policy to 
implement. In these circumstances, in fact, the fall in reserves may hamper possible 
attempts to liberalise trade A large inflow of foreign aid, by contrast, helps the 
authorities move forward w ith the liberalisation of foreign exchange markets.
17 t here is also a wealth effect, thus explaining why the cut-off point is not zero
Uff)
4 . 4 5  R e d u c i n g  t h e  M o d e l  i n t o  a  S y s t e m  o f  D i f f e r e n t i a l  E q u a t i o n s
The next step is to reduce the model into a non linear system of differential equations. 
Linearising the model around its steady state a system of the following form is obtained 
(Currie. 1985:31):
J(x  -  .v *)
49)
- A t -
’- " i ~ l l : ± u ,
w here: A  = 0 0 - " 4 ti, >  0
£/< —</(> + i/7_
Consider how in our analysis the black market exchange rate is a free variable while 
assets and reserves are both predetermined. The black market exchange rate is a free 
variable because, in analogy to the overshooting literature, it can be interpreted as a 
forward looking variable Given the great volatility and responsiveness to shocks of the 
black market exchange rate, this seems to us plausible. On the contrary the level ot 
reserves, r cannot change discretely because capital account transactions are forbidden 
The lack of capital account convertibility prevents, all in all, the possibility of 
speculative attacks. Reserves are lost only when there is an increase in the black market
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premium, which spurs exporters to divert more hard currency into the black market. 
Hard currency in the black market is also supposed to adjust sluggishly (see both 
Dornbusch et al and Morris on this).
As suggested by Dixit (1980) and Currie (1985) the system will be stable and uniquely 
determined if the number of unstable eigenvalues is equal to the number of free 
variables, i.e. if the system is characterised by one positive and two negatives 
eigenvalues
As the determinant is positive there can be either three positive eigenvalues or two 
negative and one positive. Let us rule out the case where the eigenvalues are all positive 
as the system would be, under this hypothesis, globally unstable.
Dixit (1980) and Currie (1985) have shown how it is necessary to proceed in order to 
determine the free variable as a function of the predetermined variables of the system 
To this end we first need to postulate that the free variable jumps onto the stable 
manifold11*
If i is the vector of free variables and 7. the vector of predetermined variables - both 
expressed in terms of deviations from the steady state - this relationship will be given 
by:
4 10) v = -  A/jj <V/:lZ
IX See Dornbusch et u i, footnote 3 2‘)
where M  is the matrix of eigenvectors (Dixit, 1980: 4, Currie 1985: 27) defined as:
4.11) MA = \M  
and partitioned as:
FA/.. A/,,1
4.12) A/= " '*
A/,, A/j,
It is now possible to derive the relationship linking the black market exchange rate to the 
predetermined variables of the system
4 13)
where ( hi , / / / , in, ) is the unstable eigenvector, equal to
4 14)
' in,'
\ n i x j
A, n ■+■ t/1
+a„tJ I +it2af)
+ ‘b )
I
\
m ,  >  0 
in, < 0 
m, > 0
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The stable manifold is hence equal to the following plane19:
4.15) .s* -  sh * = - /m,(,v -  x *) -  /», (r -  r *)
It is finally possible to examine the impact effect of a change in the exogenous variables 
At time t = 0 we can determine the black market premium:
4.16) .v*[/„ ] -  .s" = (,v[r„ ] -  -v *) -  m2(/•[/„ ]-/•*)
We have previously described how in response to an increase in the exogenous 
component of domestic credit there is long run fall of reserves while foreign assets 
remain unchanged:
Thus 4.16) suggests that the impact effect of an increase in domestic credit is a rise in 
the black market premium
>  V
19 To derive 4 15) il is also possible to proceed as follows
where />%< are the stable eigenvectors and />ti is the
unstable eigenvector o f the system Since saddle stability requires I, = 0  . the knowledge of the unstable 
eigenvector is sufficient lo derive 4 I S)
X -  .X*
< V ' V
II
m2 1-
---
---
---
--
1 
1
^
 
*
*
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Such response immediately starts ofT a process whereby exporters are encouraged to 
cheat the system, so that official reserves fall until the economy gets back to 
equilibrium211.
Consider also what happens when the government proceeds with a devaluation in the 
official exchange rate. If the country is a net receiver of foreign aid and. at the same 
time, does not rely too much on implicit export taxation (i.e. if y is small) a devaluation 
leads to a long run increase in reserves:
r < r *
We have also mentioned that a devaluation also leads to a fall in foreign assets:
Using 4.16, we arrive at the conclusion that the impact effect is a fall in the black 
market premium:
In sum, if y is small a devaluation of the official exchange rate starts a process in which 
reserves increase. This process begins with an immediate fall in the black market 
premium, which encourages exporters to channel reserves through the official market. 
Foreign aid helps make sustainable a process of foreign exchange liberalisation.
2" ll'the growth rale o f lI is positive the loss in reserves is permanent and so is the black market premium
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4.5 Final Remarks
Throughout this chapter we have explored the reasons why black market exchange rates 
develop and the likely consequences on the remaining macroeconomic system. In 
similar circumstances, policy makers frequently keep the domestic currency artificially 
overvalued. This is the single most important factor originating a black market exchange 
rate, as the existing literature confirms We have looked into some of the reasons why 
policy makers may decide on an overvalued exchange rate. Among these the need of 
revenue plays a very important role: revenue may be earned by the state simply by 
keeping the official exchange rate overvalued and rationing foreign exchange demand. 
A strong exchange rate, indeed, acts like an implicit tax on exports
The policy advice that international institutions generally offer is to reduce money 
supply and devalue the official exchange rate. With regard to the impact of money 
supply, the analysis arrives at the standard conclusion that a money supply expansion 
leads to a short run increase in the black market premium. Such an increase rise spurs 
exporters to divert more hard currency into the black market, hence satisfying the 
greater hard currency demand A more stable economic environment is, therefore, vital 
for reducing internal capital flight.
With regard to the official exchange rate, a devaluation is meant to reduce the black 
market premium, possibly unify the two exchange rates and finally starting off a process 
of trade liberalisation Recent black market literature has, however, recognised that this
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may not always be so simple to accomplish. The public may understand that a 
devaluation of the exchange rate has a negative fiscal impact, leading to an increased 
need to expand the money supply. This chapter is essentially a first attempt to examine 
how reserves behave in these circumstances. Reserves are very important: an increase in 
them helps the opening up of trade and the removal of existing exchange rate 
restrictions. Our model arrives at the conclusion that when an overvalued exchange rate 
acts like an implicit tax, reserves fall in the steady state, hence hampering possible 
attempts to liberalise trade
Finally, we have also explored in this chapter Morris' notion that foreign aid changes the 
fiscal structure of the government budget Let us suppose the government receiv es grants 
and financial support for specific projects in foreign currency, which is thereafter sold to 
the private sector, a devaluation of the exchange rate would act as a tax on the private 
sector and hence have a positive fiscal effect. According to our model, this process 
begins with an immediate fall in the black market premium, which in turn encourages 
exporters to channel reserves through the official market This increase in reserves helps 
sustain the process of foreign exchange liberalisation.
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Chapter 5
C onclusions
This Ph D thesis could be been as a first attempt to reconcile ideas, generally 
analysed in separate frameworks, in a unique and relatively simple context Several 
important economics issues, such as currency substitution, price stickiness, time 
inconsistency and black markets have been discussed with specific reference to 
Russian exchange rate reforms in the early 1990's
At the end of each chapter we have drawn together the main ideas explored in the 
chapter. In this final chapter, an attempt will be made to pull together all the ideas 
and conclusions that have been discussed throughout the thesis
A common theme to all four chapters has been the following: foreign exchange 
demand as a store of value is the driving force in times of extreme economic 
instability Policy makers, indeed, may try to hamper this demand but there are no 
simple ways to attain this objective When foreign exchange demand is rationed, this 
demand is likely to find alternative channels.
Thus if policy makers do not impose any restrictions on the ability to invest abroad, 
foreign exchange demand turns to the capital account. With perfect mobility of
financial capital, the Dombusch literature is the appropriate theoretical context for 
this analysis. From a technical point of view, we have presented the Buiter Miller 
version of this model, highlighting some of the interesting insights of this literature. 
We have shown, for example, how the exchange rate dynamics are closely connected 
to the behav iour of the domestic interest rate.
Furthermore, if policy makers decide to impose complete capital controls, foreign 
exchange demand may turn to the current account. With financial autarky, we have 
argued that a currency substitution model, which assumes sluggish adjustment of 
liquidity, is a suitable framework. According to this approach, an undervalued 
exchange rate improves the external position of the country, supplying the foreign 
exchange needed to satisfy economic agents' demand. Favourable surrender rules, on 
one hand, auction and interbank markets, on the other, allow foreign exchange 
demand to be satisfied through legal channels. The stock of foreign exchange, which 
the private sector gradually builds up. has been referred to as internal capital flight 
here.
Even if the above two approaches yield very different economic insights, a useful 
feature is that their analytical structure is almost identical. As a direct consequence 
of this, we have shown that the real exchange rate and liquidity behave similarly, 
both in the case of perfect capital mobility and in the case of financial autarky. In 
addition, these two models may be thought of as being complementary, as they 
describe two different economic phases in the evolution of one country : over time, 
internal capital flight is likely to become a less relevant phenomenon, while the 
importance of the domestic bond market is likely to grow.
The similar dynamic framework o f these two models has another interesting 
implication: it allows the examination of the time consistency problem in an almost
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identical manner. Applying the Cohen and Michel technique, we have examined the 
consequences of the policy credibility problem for countries w hich print money in 
order to finance the budget. Similar conclusions for both models have been reached 
concerning the impact of delegating monetary policy on the real exchange rate and 
liquidity. As long as the loss function is suitably specified, the same methodology 
may be applied to address other economic issues not explicitly considered here 
Future research may explore, for example, the current effects of a future European 
Central Banker who has different preferences about inflation than those of the 
national monetary authorities. A two country Buiter Miller model, subject to the time 
consistency constraint, may possibly shed some light on the economic consequences 
of this on output, inflation and the real exchange rate.
Finally, when policy makers decide to restrict current account convertibility, as well 
as capital account convertibility, foreign exchange demand turns, to black markets, 
as a final option An internal capital flight process is always possible, although on 
this occasion it takes place through illegal channels.
The present analysis has not included the time consistency constraint to this 
economic framework. An interesting, but probably not simple, extension would be to 
apply the Cohen and Michel technique to this economic context as well This would 
presumably highlight the role played by credibility in black foreign exchange 
markets
17«)
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